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Abstract
The authors conduct a counterfactual simulation of the proposed rules under the new Basel
Capital Accord (Basel II), including the revised treatment of expected and unexpected credit
losses proposed by the Basel Committee in October 2003. When the authors apply the simulation
to Canadian banking system data over the period 1984–2003, they ﬁnd that capital requirements
for banks will likely fall in absolute terms even after allowing for the new operational risk charge
(bearing in mind that the induced behavioural response of banks to the changed incentives under
Basel II is not captured). The impact on the volatility of required bank capital is less clear. It will
depend importantly on the credit quality distribution of banks’ loan portfolios and on the precise
way in which they calculate expected and unexpected losses.
Sensitivity analysis, including that based on a range of hypothetical distributions for banks’ loan
portfolios, shows the potential for a substantial increase in implied volatility. Moreover, if
historical relationships are a good indicator of the future, changes in required capital and
provisions for commercial and industrial, interbank, and sovereign exposures will likely be
countercyclical under Basel II (i.e., capital requirements will increase during recessions). This
raises questions about the new accord’s potentially procyclical impact on banks’ lending
behaviour, and the resultant macroeconomic implications.
JEL classiﬁcation: G21, G28, K23
Bank classiﬁcation: Financial institutions
Résumé
Les auteurs procèdent à une simulation contrefactuelle de l’incidence des règles proposées par le
Nouvel accord de Bâle sur les fonds propres (Bâle II), et notamment des modiﬁcations que le
Comité de Bâle a soumises en octobre 2003 pour le traitement des pertes anticipées et
inattendues. Pour la période de 1984 à 2003, les résultats obtenus à partir des données disponibles
sur le système bancaire canadien indiquent que le niveau des fonds propres exigés pour les
banques tendrait globalement à diminuer, même lorsqu’on intègre le nouveau coût lié à la prise en
compte des risques opérationnels. Il faut savoir cependant que les changements que susciteraient
les nouvelles incitations créées par Bâle II dans le comportement des banques ne sont pas
modélisés ici. L’effet de ces propositions sur la volatilité des fonds propres réglementaires est
moins clair. Il dépendra largement de la structure des portefeuilles de prêts (déﬁnie du point de
vue de la répartition par notation) et de la méthode que les banques utilisent pour calculer leurs
pertes anticipées et inattendues.vi
L’analyse de sensibilité, basée en particulier sur une série de structures hypothétiques de
portefeuilles de prêts, montre que les dispositions de Bâle II pourraient accentuer nettement la
volatilité des exigences en fonds propres. Qui plus est, si les liens dégagés par le passé permettent
d’augurer de l’avenir, il faut s’attendre à ce que les changements prescrits par Bâle II, en ce qui
concerne les fonds propres et les provisions exigés pour couvrir les risques associés aux créances
sur les entreprises, aux opérations interbancaires et au crédit souverain, soient de nature
contracyclique (ainsi, les fonds propres réglementaires augmenteront en période de récession).
Ces observations amènent à s’interroger sur la possibilité que le nouvel accord accroisse la
procyclicité de l’offre de crédit bancaire et sur les répercussions macroéconomiques qui en
découleraient.
Classiﬁcation JEL : G21, G28, K23
Classiﬁcation de la Banque : Institutions ﬁnancières1
1. Introduction
This paper addresses the extent to which the proposed rules under the new Basel Capital Accord
(Basel II) will introduce cyclicality in required bank capital. Capital requirements that are
sensitive to economic conditions may increase the level of required capital during future
economic slowdowns, leading banks to restrict their supply of credit and thereby exacerbating the
economic cycle through the induced procyclical behaviour.
The original Basel Accord (Basel I) on common minimum capital requirements, which had the
overall objective of strengthening the soundness of the international banking system, was adopted
by the G-10 countries in 1988. It has since been implemented in a number of additional
economies. Although causality is difﬁcult to verify, the introduction of the accord was followed
by an increase in the average G-10 risk-based capital ratio for banks, reversing a prolonged period
of decline in several major industrialized countries.1 In 1996, the accord was extended to address
the treatment of market risk arising from trading activities.
The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision is currently in the process of examining substantial
modiﬁcations to Basel I. After several years of discussion and quantitative testing, the committee
has completed a revised capital framework, recently endorsed by G-10 central bank governors and
heads of supervision. Although full implementation of the complex Basel II still remains several
years away, policy-makers are faced with the task of considering its potential implications.
The concerted effort to revise the accord has been prompted by a number of factors, including the
experience gained under Basel I, widespread ﬁnancial innovation, recognition that banks have
managed their capital requirements in unexpected ways through “capital arbitrage” (discussed
further below), and a desire to draw upon the considerable advances in ﬁnancial risk-management
practices that have been made over the past decade. The changes under consideration would
extend the accord in new directions. For example, to the existing “pillar” on minimum capital
requirements would be added two new pillars that emphasize supervisory review of banks’ capital
adequacy and improved disclosure of key information.
The central objective of the proposed changes to the ﬁrst pillar on minimum capital requirements
is to substantially increase the sensitivity of bank capital to the risk associated with speciﬁc
classes of ﬁnancial assets. These changes, and their impact over time on bank capital
requirements, are the subject of this paper. Although the analysis is carried out with speciﬁc
1. The impact of Basel I on bank capital ratios isdescribed in detail in a paper by the Bank for
International Settlements (1999).2
reference to the Canadian banking system, it is believed that the broad results are relevant to
banking systems wherever Basel II will be applied.
This paper consists of three main parts. The ﬁrst begins with section 2, which describes the
evolution of bank capital and its relationship with the macroeconomic cycle, and the impact of
Basel I on capital ratios since 1988. Section 3 describes the motivation behind Basel II and the
speciﬁc manner in which required bank capital will be calculated, and discusses possible sources
of cyclical behaviour.
In the second main part of the paper, section 4 summarizes the existing evidence on the empirical
impact of Basel II available in the literature, and section 5 summarizes the results from the
quantitative impact studies undertaken by the Bank for International Settlements (BIS). Section 6
discusses the recent global cycle in corporate credit quality, which would have inﬂuenced the
results of the BIS quantitative studies, but which also provides an interesting period in which to
test the impact of the proposed approaches under Basel II.
The third main part of the paper empirically assesses the impact of Basel II on the level and
volatility of aggregate Canadian bank capital. Section 7 provides a counterfactual analysis of how
bank capital in Canada would have evolved if the requirements of Basel II had been applied over
1984–2003. We focus on the banks’ wholesale exposures, since this is traditionally the most
signiﬁcant source of bank losses. A key constraint is that we do not have precise data on the credit
distribution of Canadian bank portfolios over time (an exception being sovereign loans). We
therefore apply several approaches to evaluate the credit risk of bank exposures: a “mapping”
technique that translates the bond yield for a given borrower into a credit rating; the use of bond-
yield spreads to derive one-year expected credit losses; and annual transition matrices that track
the evolution of credit ratings over time (data for missing years are interpolated based on several
constraints). Results from the latter two approaches are reported, effectively proxying a relatively
volatile “point-in-time” approach and a less-volatile “through-the-cycle” approach to credit
ratings. Although these approaches provide information on the evolution of credit ratings over
time, we also need an initial distribution with which to start the simulations. We experiment with
different hypothetical distributions, and report results for those that appear to most closely typify
the Canadian situation. Section 8 interprets the results from the perspective of the implied
volatility in required bank capital.
Section 9 offers some conclusions. Overall, our results are consistent with those found elsewhere.
Speciﬁcally, the implied required level of bank capital under Basel II would be substantially
below both actual and required current levels. Nevertheless, signiﬁcant potential remains for
volatility in required capital, conditional on the economic cycle. A number of factors could3
mitigate the actual impact of Basel II on bank capital, particularly the manner in which domestic
supervisors implement the new accord.
2. Bank Capital and the Canadian Economy
A commonly raised concern is that Basel II capital requirements will be countercyclical: capital
requirements would increase during recessions, and thus possibly induce procyclical lending
behaviour on the part of banks. Therefore, it would be useful to know the extent to which capital
ratios are already correlated with the Canadian business cycle. In particular, a leading relationship
might suggest that variations in bank capital have ampliﬁed previous economic cycles, a
phenomenon that one should be cautious about exacerbating in any new capital requirements. The
objective of this section is to determine the strength, timing, and pattern of any relationships
between banking system and macroeconomic variables.
Until 1980, Canadian bank capital ratios had been trending downward for over a century (Figure
1). As the banking system consolidated, the implicit subsidy of the broadening regulatory safety
net became more apparent. Capital ratios declined largely without a corresponding increase in the
frequency of bank failures and distressed mergers.2 Over the 1980s and early 1990s, several
Canadian banks did fail, along with 35 trust, mortgage, and loan corporations, but largely because
of poor lending decisions, rather than undercapitalization.
2. U.S. ﬁnancial institution failures peaked in the 1980s after a similar decline in capital ratios.


















Figure 1: Canadian Bank Capital, Failures, and Mergers
*Does not include the 40 trust, mortgage, and loan corporations that have failed since 1967
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The impact of ﬁnancial regulation is more difﬁcult to discern from the data. For example,
extensions of the ﬁnancial safety net (the creation of the Bank of Canada in 1935 and the
Canadian Deposit Insurance Corporation (CDIC) in 1967) occurred well after major turning
points in the trend. Similarly, capital ratios reversed their trend in 1980, well before the
implementation of the (albeit long-anticipated) Basel Accord in 1988.
There has been a very strong correlation (0.89) between movements in the Canadian banking
system capital ratio and that for the United States, despite the two countries’ very different
regulatory regimes and banking system characteristics (Figure 2). It is possible that regulatory
changes in the United States indirectly affected Canadian capital ratios through competitive
forces. For example, Canadian supervisors may have unofﬁcially adjusted their judgment-based
requirements to avoid large differences between the two banking systems. Alternatively,
management may have sought comparable ratios to gain easier access to capital market funding.
Subsequent to Basel I, the evolution of the two countries’ capital ratios diverged from their
historical pattern (as discussed in greater detail below). During that period, there was a signiﬁcant
evolution in Canada’s ﬁnancial supervisory regime, towards clearer goals and improved incentives
to act with regards to troubled institutions, as well as a greater authority to act.
The persistent difference in levels between the Canadian and American bank capital ratios can be
partially explained by signiﬁcant differences in accounting regimes, including the treatment of
equity and booking of provisions, and partially by the relatively larger median size and asset
diversity, and therefore generally lower risk, of Canadian banks. Indeed, the average Canadian
bank is about 170 times bigger than the average U.S. commercial bank by asset value (and about
104 times bigger in terms of capital). Capital ratios for just the 30 largest U.S. commercial banks,
which are more comparable in scale and scope of activity to Canadian banks, are somewhat lower
than the overall U.S. average, but not by enough to explain the entire difference in capital ratios.
As stated earlier, however, trends in the two countries’ capital ratios have been very similar.5
Since capital is relatively stable compared with assets, and assets are procyclical, the capital ratio
has tended to decline during economic expansions (Figures 3 and 4). The only exceptions to this
pattern in the modern period were the second half of the 1950s and the 1980s, which coincided
with shifts in banking supervision in the United States but not in Canada.3,4
Output growth and changes in the capital ratio are negatively correlated (–0.26), and a casual
inspection of the historical data for Canada suggests that a large increase in the capital ratio has
been followed by a contraction of real output during certain episodes (Figure 3). Early
occurrences were the recession of 1883 and the Great Depression (when banks continued to
accumulate capital for several years following a decline in the value of their assets). Of greater
relevance, the 1960 and 1990–91 recessions were preceded by extended periods of rising capital
3. According to the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) (2003a) in the United States,“In
1952, different capital-to-risk assets ratios were proposed in separate studiesby a committee of the
NewYorkStateBankersAssociation,theIllinoisBankersAssociation,andtheFederalReserveBank
of New York. The Board of Governorsof the Federal Reserve developed a ‘Form for Analyzing Bank
Capital’ in 1956.”




and loan loss reserves) toaverage total assets....T h eFederal Reserve Board and the Ofﬁce of the
Comptroller of the Currency announced a minimum primary capital adequacy ratio of 6 percent for
community banks and 5 percent for larger regional institutions. The FDIC established a threshold
capital-to-assets ratio of 6 percent and a minimum ratio of 5 percent. Overthe next decade, regulators
worked to converge upon a uniform measure.”




















Figure 2: Reported Bank Capital Ratios Over History*
*Total capital at book value. Prior to the 1990s, capital ratios would have likely been lower had
 modern-day "fair value" accounting principles been used, in particular when recognizing loan losses.
Sources: Bank of Canada (2004), FDIC (2004)6
ratios, followed by weak asset growth. Capital ratios also increased sharply during the double
recession of the early 1980s, which was followed by a contraction in bank lending (Figure 4).
More formal statistical tests of these relationships are presented in the appendix. The evidence
provided by the tests is not so clear, perhaps because capital ratios have also increased during
certain periods of strong economic expansion. Indeed, the reported pairwise Granger causality
tests do not detect a direct causal relationship between real output growth and changes in the
capital ratio or the growth rate of capital. Furthermore, judging from simple vector
autoregressions over long time horizons, output appears to be invariant to the capital ratio. In
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Figure 3: Economic booms and the capital ratio
(annual, 1870 to 2002)
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Figure 4: Economic Booms, Bank Capital, and Credit
(quarterly, 1980Q2 to 2002Q4)
Sources: Bank of Canada (1980-2004), Statistics Canada (2004), and authors’ calculations
1980-1982 recession7
summary, although these are rather simple tests, they suggest that there is little historical evidence
in Canada that either the level or growth rate of bank capital has inﬂuenced, or been inﬂuenced by,
broader macroeconomic phenomena. Taken alone, this should temper some of the concerns about
the sensitivity of economic growth to a change in the capital regime.
2.1 The effect of Basel I on the Canadian banking system
The phasing-in of Basel I coincided with signiﬁcant regulatory changes and macroeconomic
developments in Canada. The combined effect on the balance sheets of Canadian banks was
pronounced. The fundamental building block of Basel I is its asset risk-weighting formula.
Following the accord’s introduction in 1988, Canadian banks steadily increased the proportion of
their assets that carried zero or low capital charges. Such assets primarily include publicly
guaranteed securities and insured or highly collateralized residential mortgages, the markets for
which were growing strongly over this period.5 Also, as a result of corporate restructuring during
the recession of the early 1990s, there was a marked decline in banks’ corporate exposures, which
under Basel I generally carry a 100 per cent risk-weighting (equal to an 8 per cent capital charge).
The net result is illustrated in Figure 5, which shows the percentage of risk-weighted assets to
total assets for Canadian banks and U.S. commercial banks. The ratio has fallen steadily in
Canada, from around 90 per cent in 1989 to 50 per cent at present.6 According to the Basel risk-
classiﬁcation system, therefore, the average riskiness of assets held by Canadian banks has fallen
signiﬁcantly. On the other hand, the ratio for U.S. commercial banks has remained relatively
stable at around 60 per cent.
5. The share of insured residential mortgages, which typically carry a zero risk weight under the Basel
capital-adequacy formula, has risen from around 25 per cent in1992 to 50 per cent currently.
6. Atthesametime,off-balance-sheetexposuresasashareoftotalassetshavefallenfrom14percentin
1994 to around 7 per cent currently. (Off-balance-sheet exposures are risk-weighted. Notional
exposures may be considerably higher.)8
The decline in the average risk-weighting of Canadian banks’ assets, both on- and off-balance
sheet, has helped boost their Tier 1 capital ratios from under 5 per cent in 1988 to over 9 per cent
today (Figure 6). On a non-risk-weighted basis (core), however, capital ratios in Canada have
remained relatively unchanged over the past 14 years (Figure 7). In contrast, Tier 1 capital ratios
of U.S. commercial banks have risen sharply since the introduction of Basel I, from under 8 per
cent to over 10 per cent by 1994, principally through an accumulation of core capital.

























Figure 5: Implied Average Risk Weight of Banks’ Assets
(risk-weighted assets/total assets)
Both risk-weighted and total assets include on- and off-balance-sheet exposures.
Sources: Bank of Canada (2004), FDIC (2004), and BIS (2004)





















Figure 6: Tier 1 Capital Ratios
Sources: Bank of Canada (2004) and BIS (2004)9
3. Basel II and Potential Implications
Although neither the deﬁnition of regulatory capital under Basel II nor the minimum required
ratio of 8 per cent changes, the risk weights of speciﬁc assets will vary over time. Capital
requirements therefore have the potential to be countercyclical. This key element of the new
accord is the primary source of concerns raised thus far, which are described in section 3.1. In
section 3.2 we describe in detail the computation of capital requirements under Basel II. The
sources of cyclicality in Basel II are described in section 3.3.
3.1 Objective and potential implications of Basel II
The objective of making the amount of capital that is held by a bank sensitive to the extent of the
risk (in this case, credit risk) that it faces on its ﬁnancial assets is both sensible and laudable (we
do not attempt to deﬁne the “optimal” level of bank capital). If capital is being held by the bank to
contribute to its survivability in the face of adverse circumstances, then it appears reasonable that
the level of capital should bear some relationship to the likelihood of those circumstances
occurring.
While the overall goal may be laudable, how best to measure risk and equate it with required
capital remains a difﬁcult question to answer. The approaches proposed in Basel II, intended to
make capital requirements more sensitive to the measured riskiness of bank portfolios, have raised
some concern as to their potential impact. Speciﬁcally, if the degree of risk is correlated with
broad systemic events, then the risk associated with banks’ asset portfolios will vary with those
















Figure 7: Core Capital Ratios
(equity/assets at book value)
Sources: Bank of Canada (2004) and BIS (2004)10
events. The event that is generally cited in this regard is the business cycle. If credit quality
improves signiﬁcantly during periods of strong economic growth, and falls during downturns,
then across the aggregate bank sector the capital required under Basel II could, in principle, fall
and rise in tandem. The volatility, or cyclicality, that this could conceivably create in bank capital
has become an important issue.
In particular, during an economic downturn, if the required level of bank capital rises sharply,
banks might choose to reduce their assets (i.e., scale back the growth of new lending or reduce
existing loans) if they are either unable or unwilling to increase their capital in line with
regulatory requirements. During an economic boom, if a reduction in the overall riskiness of the
portfolio leads to an excess of capital, banks may be induced to further raise their lending during
the boom (possibly reducing their lending standards in the process).7 While this latter scenario
may appear relatively sanguine, some observers argue that “excessive” lending lays the seeds for
subsequent economic and ﬁnancial “busts.”8 Thus, varying levels of capital charges may inﬂuence
bank lending behaviour in a manner that would reinforce the cycle in economic activity, the so-
called procyclicality issue. The new accord therefore holds potential implications for the
macroeconomy, and for policy-makers concerned with macroeconomic performance.
A key issue is how severe the implications will be for procyclicality. Recall that risk sensitivity in
the Basel Accord is not itself new. Basel I set minimum capital requirements for a deﬁned set of
asset “baskets,” with the capital charge for each basket set broadly in line with the perceived risk
for the assets it encompassed as a group. Corporate loans, for example, were placed in one basket,
with a risk weight of 100 per cent, and residential claims backed by mortgages were placed in
another basket, with a lower risk weight of 50 per cent.9 Overall, Basel I required banks to hold
minimum total capital equal to 8 per cent of their risk-adjusted assets (including off-balance-sheet
items). With Basel II, the overall minimum required ratio remains at 8 per cent (the deﬁnition of
regulatory capital also does not change).
Although Basel I introduced explicit risk sensitivity, the capital requirements associated with
speciﬁc assets were invariant over time, such that the capital charge faced by the bank would
change only when it changed its holdings of assets. By broadening the range of risk baskets, and
7. Induced reductions in lendingstandards could magnify the credit problems that banks experience
during subsequent downturns.
8. See Lowe (2002, 3) for a discussion of the proposition that “risk is built up in the boom but
materializes in the downturn.”
9. Theriskweightsaredeﬁnedasapercentoftheoveralltargetfortheminimumcapitalratio,whichis
8 per cent.11
by allowing assets to potentially move between baskets to reﬂect changes in their risk
characteristics, Basel II seeks to address some of the limitations of Basel I.
It is also the case, however, that cyclicality within the banking system is not new. Lending
institutions have long faced changing credit conditions, and cyclical elements can be observed in
past lending behaviour and changing provisions for doubtful loans. Thus, a fundamental issue is
whether Basel II will create additional volatility in capital; i.e., induce behaviour not already
present in the ﬁnancial system (and in turn create additional volatility in bank lending). Other
compensating features that reduce the impact of Basel II may also be present. For example, banks
often maintain capital in excess of the Basel minimum. To the extent that they are willing to allow
variation in these stocks of “buffer capital,” this could, in principle, absorb some of the variation
induced by a change in riskiness, and mitigate the cyclical effects of Basel II (Figure 8).
Another aspect of the original accord that Basel II seeks to address is the incentive created for
capital arbitrage, in which banks may have been inclined to hold assets where the capital charge
was relatively small compared with the potential return and risk. Similarly, banks would tend to
minimize assets where the capital charge overstated the actual (economic) risk. Indeed, this
“regulatory capital arbitrage” is viewed as one of the primary drivers behind the development of
securitization markets, in Canada and elsewhere. The securitization of assets, over a progressively
broader range of asset classes, has allowed banks to reduce their risk-weighted assets and raise
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Figure 8: Bank Capital Ratios
Sources: Bank of Canada (1991-2004) and BIS (2004)12
their capital ratios (Figure 9).10 By reducing the opportunities for capital arbitrage, Basel II could
increase overall risk sensitivity.
3.2 Computing capital requirements under Basel II
The key change under the ﬁrst pillar of Basel II is that the risk associated with a particular asset,
and therefore the capital charge assigned to it, can vary over time.11 If a reassessment shifts an
asset to a riskier asset bucket, that asset will draw a higher capital charge. The cyclicality of Basel
II will be determined by the way in which the accord calculates the riskiness of asset portfolios
over time and the resulting capital charge. To calculate the riskiness of an asset, two general
approaches are proposed under Basel II: the standardized approach, and, for banks deemed to
have sufﬁciently sophisticated risk-management systems, the internal ratings-based (IRB)
approach. Under the standardized approach, the probability of default, or riskiness, will be
derived from the ratings established by external credit rating agencies, where available.12 Table 1
summarizes the proposed risk weights for corporate exposures.
10. Standard & Poor’s estimate that, in the third quarter of 2002,the securitization activity of the ﬁve
largest Canadian banks allowed them to improve their average capital ratio by approximately half a
percentage point (Standard & Poor’s 2002). See BIS (1999, 21–26) for a related discussion.
11. BaselIIwillalsointroduceacapitalchargeforoperationalrisk(BIS2003a,2003c).Thetreatmentfor
market risk, introduced in the 1996 amendment, will remain unchanged.
12. Thepotentialinﬂuencethisgivescreditratingagencieswithintheﬁnancialsystemhasbeenthesource
of considerable discussion.





















Figure 9: Securitization by Financial Institutions
 (total credit)
Source: Bank of Canada (1995-2004)13
Under the IRB approach, the capital (K) charge for wholesale exposures (i.e., commercial and
industrial, interbank, and sovereign) is,
(1)
where N is the normal cumulative distribution function, LGD is loss given default, and EAD is
exposure at default.13 As the equation shows, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision has
selected a 99.9 per cent conﬁdence threshold. The correlation between exposures, r, is determined
by the committee and given by,
(2)
The term subtracted from the right-hand side of equation (1) is the expected loss. The remainder is
the unexpected loss. Since banks in most advanced countries are already required to provision
against expected loss, it has been agreed that having to hold capital against this amount as well is
redundant (Kupiec 2003). As a result, the Basel Committee announced in October 2003 that the
IRB approaches will capitalize only unexpected losses (hence the appearance of the subtracted
term). Any shortfall, however, between the sum of a bank’s general and speciﬁc loan-loss
provisions and the estimated expected loss will have to be capitalized.14
Table 1: Proposed Risk Weights for Corporate Exposures
Rating AAA to
AA– A+ to A– BBB+ to
BB–
Below BB– Unrated Past due
Risk weighta
a. As a percentage of the 8 per cent minimum capital ratio
20 50 100 150 100 150
13. N(x) denotes the cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable (i.e., the
probability that a normal random variable with mean zero and variance of one is less than or equal to
x). N-1(z) denotes the inverse cumulative distribution function for a standard normal random variable
(i.e., the value ofxsuch thatN(x)=z) (BIS 2002).
14. Currently,halfoftheshortfallcouldbemadeupforwithTier2capital.Adebateisongoing,however,
as to whether Tier 2 capital should be admissible for IRB capital requirements.
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The amount required to be allocated to provisions for expected loss and the amount required to be
held as regulatory capital for unexpected loss are shown in Figure 10 as a function of the
probability of default. An LGD of 45 per cent is assumed in this example.
Under the advanced IRB approach, LGD can be estimated by the individual institutions. Under
the foundation IRB approach, it will be set at 45 per cent, which is the loss rate we will use in the
following counterfactual exercises. Based on current anecdotal information, however, 45 per cent
may be at the high end of the range for Canadian banks.15
Under the advanced IRB approach, exposure at default can be estimated by the individual
institutions. Under the foundation IRB approach, it is a function of the probability of default and
maturity, where longer maturities require more capital,
(3)
where b is an adjustment to the maturity,
(4)





























Figure 10: Expected and Unexpected Loss Under Basel II
Probability of default (per cent)
EAD 1 1.5 bP D () ´ – () 1 – 1 M 2.5 – () bP D () ´ + () ´ = ,
b 0.08451 0.05898 PD () log ´ – () 2 = .15
The minimum maturity allowed for calculations is one year, and the maximum is ﬁve years.
Anecdotally, average portfolio maturities for Canadian banks are around two years. In the
following counterfactual analysis, we err on the side of prudence and use the somewhat more
conservative assumption of an average maturity of 2.5 years.
3.3 Sources of cyclicality in Basel II
In this section, we discuss potential sources of cyclicality inherent within the three different
capital approaches of Basel II: standardized, foundation IRB, and advanced IRB. Under the
standardized approach, cyclical effects could enter through the potential for the relevant credit
ratings to deteriorate during economic downturns (or to improve during upturns). Credit rating
agencies argue that they take a “through-the-cycle” approach to ratings; that is, the rating should
be based on the assumption of an adverse conﬂuence of events of a typical severity and
probability, regardless of current economic conditions. There is ample evidence, however, that the
current state of the business cycle affects ratings.16 If no external rating is applied (possibly
because it is not available), in most cases a risk weighting of 100 per cent is used. For unrated
loans, there would be no direct cyclical impact on asset riskiness (unless the loan became past due
owing to deteriorating economic circumstances, such that the risk weighting was raised to 150 per
cent).17
Under the alternative IRB approaches, qualiﬁed banks will be allowed to estimate the default
probabilities themselves, which are then translated into a capital charge, according to the formulae
described in section 3.2 (with the speciﬁc calculation varying somewhat across exposure types).
The risk weights that arise from the IRB approach form a continuum of weights (recall Figure
10). Table 2 describes the key risk components that underlie the calculations that inﬂuence the
presence of cyclicality.
It is less clear how important cyclical effects will be under the IRB approach, where banks can
use their own credit-risk models. To the extent that their own risk assessments mimic those of the
credit rating agencies, however, the same cyclicality issues arise. Some large ﬁnancial institutions
have made increasing use of value-at-risk (VAR) models. These models, tending to reﬂect a
“point-in-time” assessment, and possibly using volatile variables such as equity prices, can
potentially produce quite strong cyclical effects.
16. Amato and Furﬁne(2003) provide extensive evidence on the sensitivity of credit ratings to business
cycle conditions.
17. Underthestandardizedapproach,thegreatertheproportionofassetsthatdonothaveexternalratings,
the more Basel IIreduces to the original accord.16
The variables described in Table 2 are set by the Basel Committee with respect to the standardized
approach. For example, under current proposals, the LGD would be set at 45 per cent for
unsecured general credit obligations, and at 75 per cent for subordinated exposures. The IRB
approach, however, allows for progressively greater input by qualiﬁed banks in calculating
portfolio riskiness (within certain constraints). Under the foundation IRB approach, banks would
set the values of LGD for each asset. For banks that apply the advanced IRB approach, they would
also set EAD and M.18 There is strong empirical evidence that percentage losses tend to rise
during economic contractions, such that further cyclicality could in principle be introduced by
changes in LGD correlated with the economic cycle (rising, for example, during an economic
downturn). Similarly, if borrowers are more likely to draw down loan commitments during times
of economic stress, EAD could change as well (via the conversion factor that translates loan
commitments into current exposures). The capital charge formulae also incorporate an asset
correlation factor (an assumption regarding the correlations among the default probabilities of
different asset pools), which could vary with the economic cycle.19
While these other potential sources of cyclicality raise issues as to the structure of the formulae
and the most appropriate values for the inputs, they may have little impact in practice on
cyclicality, since they are unlikely to be changed dramatically from period to period by the banks
under the IRB approach (and are held constant under the standardized approach). In addition,
even under the advanced IRB approach the formulae are speciﬁed by the Basel Committee, such
that the banks are still constrained in determining the capital charge.20 Nevertheless, even if the
Table 2: Key Risk Components
PD Probability
of default
The likelihood that the borrower will
default over a given time horizon
LGD Loss given
default
The proportion of the exposure that will
be lost if a default occurs
EAD Exposure at
default
Book value of the asset less effects from
credit-risk mitigation
M Maturity Remaining economic maturity of the
exposure in years
18. TheEADincludesanyadditionalcreditfacilitiesthattheborrowerwilllikelydrawdowninthefuture.
19. There is some empirical evidence that asset correlations tend to rise during periods of ﬁnancial stress.
These potential sources of cyclicality are reviewed inLowe (2002).
20. There are also constraints on the other inputs. For example, LGD should represent the expected loss
under adverse economic conditions, while M must be between one and ﬁve years.17
values of these inputs are held invariant over the cycle, the precise values selected by the Basel
Committee may inﬂuence the impact of cyclical changes in PD on the calculation of asset
riskiness.
Basel II explicitly addresses the issue of securitization. Otherwise, the new accord “would remain
vulnerable to capital arbitrage,” as under Basel I, where banks were able in certain cases “to avoid
maintaining capital commensurate with the risk to which they are exposed” (BIS 2003a, 7). Basel II
is much more explicit regarding the risk weights to be applied to securitization exposures. It also
addresses the recognition of provisions and the issue of credit-risk mitigants (including a range of
credit-risk transfer instruments). A key issue will be whether credit-risk mitigation, including
provisioning, will to some extent offset any additional cyclicality introduced by Basel II. In other
words, credit-risk mitigation techniques currently being implemented by banks as a group may act
as a partial offset to the cyclicality that arises from a changing probability of default.
4. A Review of the Literature
A substantial literature has developed around Basel I, including research on the potential impact
of procyclical effects to which it might have given rise. These effects are summarized in BIS
(1999), where it is concluded there is some evidence that, in speciﬁc instances, bank lending has
been constrained by capital requirements, but that the overall macroeconomic impact appears
limited. It is not entirely clear that the constraints would not have appeared anyway in the absence
of the Basel Accord; i.e., it is not clear that Basel I exacerbated the cyclicality that already existed
in the ﬁnancial system. Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, and Tsomocos (2003, 10), for example, argue
that the effects of Basel I on economic cycles “is likely to be muted because earnings are the ﬁrst
buffer against the need to raise provisions or write off loans.” In addition, “modest falls in capital
may be covered by increased use of subordinated debt which is included under Tier 2 capital.”
The potential for cyclical effects on bank capital, however, appears to be much greater under
Basel II. This issue (in addition to that of a possible one-time shift in the level of bank capital
created by the accord) has been the subject of a small but growing body of empirical literature,
which we review here.
Carpenter, Whitesell, and Zakrajsek (2001) provide some empirical estimates of the potential
cyclicality of capital based on the standardized approach. From a sample of U.S., non-ﬁnancial
issuers, they develop quarterly transition matrices for credit ratings from 1970 through 2000.21 By
21. Thematricesarebasedonthenumberofissuesandnotthetotalvalueofdebt.Whilethelackofvalue-
weighted transition matrices is unfortunate, it isunlikely to be important for large samples.18
applying Basel II over this period,22 Carpenter, Whitesell, and Zakrajsek are able to derive the
level of capital charges that would have occurred had the accord applied at that time. In particular,
they are able to examine how the capital charges would have evolved over complete business
cycles.
Carpenter, Whitesell, and Zakrajsek emphasize several important ﬁndings regarding credit
ratings. Technically, credit ratings are based on a borrower’s ability to meet debt obligations
during adverse economic circumstances, and do not correspond to a probability of default over a
one-year horizon. While this suggests a “through-the-cycle” approach, the information available
during actual downturns suggests that credit ratings in fact reﬂect some cyclical effects (this may
be particularly true if the cycle has some unusual characteristics, such as the bursting of the hi-
tech bubble and corporate governance issues). The withdrawal of credit ratings for particular
issues also potentially affects the data. The authors note, however, that the large majority of credit
rating withdrawals occur because the security is maturing or otherwise being called, and not
because of a deterioration in credit quality (thus, excluding these issues is unlikely to introduce
signiﬁcant bias).
Their results show that, from 1998 to 2000, the required level of capital was less than that
stipulated under Basel I (8 per cent). They attribute the drop in capital in part to a possible
tightening by banks of standards for business lending in response to the deteriorating quality of
loan portfolios during this period (which is a typical cyclical pattern of bank behaviour that is
independent of capital requirements). An additional factor that may contribute to this result (not
discussed by Carpenter, Whitesell, and Zakrajsek) is that, if the Basel Committee’s overall
objective of maintaining the same minimum capital requirement as Basel I is to be achieved, then
the new capital charge for operational risk implies that the aggregate charge for credit risk must be
proportionally less under Basel II. Nevertheless, these results suggest that banks will effectively
have a capital buffer with which any cyclical effects might conceivably be dampened.
An even more interesting ﬁnding is that the level of total capital requirements under Basel II
would be slightly less volatile for the banking sector as a whole. This suggests that cyclicality in
the capital charge could be less, not more, relative to Basel I, and Carpenter, Whitesell, and
Zakrajsek conclude that, for the standardized approach, “the new Accord is unlikely to induce
material increases in procyclicality” (p. 24). To understand this ﬁnding, it is important to recall
that the aggregate level of the capital charge is the result of both the size and quality distribution
22. TheauthorsofthisandotherpapersusetheproposedBaselIIrulesthatwereavailableatthetimethey
completedtheirwork.Theseproposalshavesteadilyevolved,andinsomecasesthechangeshavebeen
speciﬁcally designed to reduce the potential for cyclical effectsin capital charges.19
of the asset portfolio. The authors suggest that, when loans are growing rapidly, there may be a
compensating tendency for the distribution of loans to shift to less-risky loans. This would be
consistent with an improving economic environment that reduced the probability of default. With
the reduced riskiness being reﬂected under Basel II, the implied capital charge would rise less (in
response to the increase in loans) than under Basel I. The reverse would presumably be the case if
loans grew less rapidly during economic downturns (with deteriorating credit quality at least
partly offsetting the slower growth in loans).
A concern with the above historical approach, however, is that it does not capture the induced
effect that procyclicality might have on the lending behaviour of banks. When loan portfolios are
growing rapidly, if improving credit quality reduces the corresponding growth in capital
requirements, might not banks be induced to lend even more? During economic downturns,
because deteriorating credit quality means that the capital charge does not fall (or slow in growth)
as much as otherwise would have been the case, might not banks further reduce their lending? By
deﬁnition, these induced feedback effects on the aggregate level of loans, and therefore on capital,
are not captured by historical episodes, and thus the question of procyclicality is not fully
answered.
To abstract from the above problem, some authors have examined only the effect on the capital
charge that arises from a change in credit quality, using an asset portfolio of constant magnitude
(other than defaults). Ervin and Wilde (2001), drawing upon a U.S. transition matrix for 1990,
when there was a general deterioration in credit quality, calculate that the Basel II rules, as
proposed in 2001, would have required a large increase in capital over that short time span (about
20 per cent). Purhonen (2002) also examines the potential impact of changes in credit quality that
are reﬂected in public credit ratings (ignoring, as others often do, the impact of credit-risk
mitigation and credit loss, for example). Using Basel II, Purhonen ﬁnds that an approach that
reﬂects the standardized approach produces “surprisingly low” volatility in the capital charge. He
argues that this is because of the relative stability in the ratings of the large issuers contained in his
sample. Using a VAR approach designed to reﬂect the IRB approach, however, he ﬁnds
exceptional volatility (30 per cent over a single quarter in one case).
Carling et al. (2002) assess the IRB approach, employing a rich data set drawn from the loan
portfolio of a single bank (using quarterly data between 1994 and 2000). Their data reveal
considerable movement over time in the average default rate of the bank’s portfolio (the default
rate also varies across loan types and industries). In an approach designed to mimic the Basel II
IRB approach, they estimate a reduced-form credit-risk model that produces a VAR measure for
the bank’s corporate loan portfolio. Default probabilities are taken from 1-, 4-, and 12-quarter20
moving averages of historical default frequencies and the credit-risk model estimates. Consistent
with the ﬁndings above, Carling et al. ﬁnd substantial quarterly volatility in the capital charge
(although in some periods the level of the capital charge appears to fall to unrealistically low
levels).
Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, and Tsomocos (2003) evaluate the impact on the capital charge
between two different credit quality “states” in more detail. They examine the capital
requirements that emerge from internal ratings based on (i) a ratings industry approach, and (ii) a
Merton-type VAR model. Using four different portfolio distributions for corporate exposures
(from the United States, Europe, and the G-10 countries) that are generally drawn from a period
of strong economic growth, Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, and Tsomocos apply credit rating
transition matrices based on an average of economic downturns, and on the early 1990s recession,
to produce stressed quality distributions. The change in capital requirements is then calculated
between the two credit quality distributions. Based on the proposals as of October 2002, they ﬁnd
an increase in capital requirements ranging from 10 to 18 per cent. However, if provisions are
allowed to be applied against defaulted loans, then capital requirements for the non-defaulted
portfolio would be largely unchanged.23 Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, and Tsomocos ﬁnd that
results under a Merton-type VAR model are much more volatile.
A number of authors have suggested that the potential inﬂuence of Basel II on cyclicality in
capital requirements will be partially, or entirely, mitigated by the presence of capital buffers; i.e.,
the excess capital typically held by many banks. Bikker and Hu (2002) observe that capital and
reserves in G-10 countries are typically higher, and often signiﬁcantly higher, than the minimum
capital requirements. They suggest that this may occur because banks are aiming at higher
external credit ratings than would correspond with the minimum requirements. They also suggest
that banks look farther out than the one-year default horizon in Basel II when provisioning, in part
to smooth their proﬁts. As a result of “countercyclical” provisioning (i.e., setting aside provisions
in boom times), banks are signiﬁcantly less procyclical than the business cycle might suggest.
Peura and Jokivuolle (2003) also suggest that banks will hold signiﬁcant stocks of buffer capital,
perhaps because they are encouraged to do so under the second pillar of Basel II.24 They develop
a dynamic model of capital buffers based on historical data (which incorporates “stressful”
events). The degree of conﬁdence desired with respect to not dropping below the minimum capital
level will affect the desired level of buffer capital. They ﬁnd, however, that under the IRB
23. Although Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, and Tsomocos designed their approach before the Basel
Committee removed expected loss from the capital formulae, their treatment is roughly similar tothe
new requirements for provisions.
24. This highlights the point that the actions of national regulators under the second pillar could have an
important impact on outcomes under Basel II.21
approach the total amount of capital is likely to increase under Basel II. Similar to results reported
above, the required buffer capital would be larger than under the standardized approach.
Other papers emphasize the potential for cyclical impacts to arise from sources other than the
rated credit quality of the asset. This is particularly relevant to banks that intend to apply the
advanced IRB approach, where they potentially can determine the values of other variables that
enter into the risk-weight formula (especially LGD, but also variables such as EAD and M). Lowe
(2002) provides an extensive analysis of cyclical effects that could arise, in particular owing to
changes in expected loss (or LGD) at different points in the cycle. However, it is also emphasized
that the way in which regulators choose to implement Basel II (for example, to what extent they
require banks to maintain typical levels of capital above the Basel minimum requirements) will
inﬂuence importantly the degree of cyclicality. While Lowe concludes that VAR models
implemented under the advanced IRB approach have the potential to introduce substantial level
changes and volatility into expected default rates, this may be mitigated by other factors, such as
improvements in credit-risk management, capital buffers over regulatory minimums, and changes
in supervisory practices.
Allen and Saunders (2003) suggest that the growing use of credit-risk measurement models (e.g.,
Merton-type models) may accentuate the procyclical tendencies that already exist within the
banking sector, regardless of what is required by Basel II. For example, these models will tend to
produce “overly optimistic” estimates of default risk during booms, reinforcing the tendency to
overlend. This emphasizes the important point that what is critical from the perspective of Basel II
(but not necessarily from the perspective of regulators) is the additional cyclicality that it will
introduce into a system that already has cyclical tendencies. As with Lowe, it is also noted that
under the IRB approach, cyclical inﬂuences can emerge from a range of variables that ultimately
contribute to the estimates of default probability.
The work by Allen and Saunders, and others, stresses the particularly important impact that
changes in the assumed value of LGD could have on the required capital charge. Altman, Resti,
and Sironi (2002) undertake an extensive simulation exercise, applying annual ratings transition
matrices over the period 1981–2000 to a somewhat stylized loan portfolio. They contrast a
scenario where the value of LGD is held constant at 50 per cent, to one where LGD is correlated
with changes in default rates and allowed to vary between 40 and 60 per cent. In the latter
scenario, the positive correlation between LGD and default rates brings about a sharp increase in
the cyclicality of capital charges under Basel II. Cave et al. (2003) also emphasize the potentially
central role of LGD estimates for banks applying the advanced IRB approach. They show that,
under the proposed formula, the capital charge would be directly proportional to the loan’s22
estimated LGD. They also calculate the capital charge that would arise for an “average” portfolio
and a “stressed” portfolio that draws on data from 2002, when credit quality was under downward
pressure. These scenarios all produce lower minimum capital requirements than Basel I
(excluding the proposed charge for operational risk), but the reduction is signiﬁcantly less under
the stressed scenario, which implies the presence of cyclicality.
Altman, Resti, and Sironi (2002) and Cave et al. (2003) again emphasize that supervisory
involvement in the implementation of Basel II will have a signiﬁcant impact on outcomes. For
example, banks using the advanced IRB approach (and their regulators) may use a longer-term
view of LGD that would mitigate its potential cyclical impact. As Altman, Resti, and Sironi point
out, however, this could trade stability for precision, because banks maintain a less up-to-date
picture of their risks. Cave et al. suggest that the intent is to use a period of ﬁnancial stress to
generate representative LGDs. Similarly, while PD has a one-year horizon, it is expected that
banks will be encouraged to take a conservative view of PDs such that loans originating from
cyclically vulnerable industries could be slotted into a lower rating grade than long-run average
PDs would indicate.
French (2004) estimates the capital impact of Basel II’s advanced internal ratings-based approach
for all FDIC-insured commercial banks. The reference period is similar to our own, 1984–2002.
The author develops several scenarios for a range of risk parameters that banks might use in the
capital formulae. The scenarios are conducted for four portfolios, including wholesale loans,
aggregated across all banks. The net charge-off rate is used as a proxy of expected loss, from
which a corresponding unexpected loss is derived. French ﬁnds that Basel II capital requirements
will likely be much lower in level terms than those of Basel I; in fact, they will be “well below the
levels needed for current Prompt Corrective Action (PCA) purposes.” French also reports very
large swings in capital ratios over the cycle for wholesale lending, in excess of ﬁve percentage
points.
5. Highlights from the Basel Committee’s Third Quantitative
Impact Study
The BIS has undertaken several quantitative assessments of the impact that Basel II will have on
banks’ actual capital requirements. The ﬁrst quantitative impact study (QIS) was completed in
2000 (Table 3). The third full QIS (QIS 3) was initiated in October 2002, and the summary results
published in May 2003 (BIS 2003b). In total, 365 banks from 43 countries participated in QIS 3.
Results are reported for several different groups of banks, and this discussion follows those
reported for the “G-10 Group 1” banks, which the committee believes is “broadly representative23
of the large, internationally active banks in these countries [the G-10].” Among the available
groups, it is likely to be most representative of the situation that the major Canadian banks are
facing.
A key aspect of Basel II is that it retains Basel I’s minimum 8 per cent required ratio of capital to
risk-adjusted assets. In other words, although the proposed revisions are intended to substantially
increase the sensitivity of capital to the riskiness of assets (in addition to introducing an explicit
capital charge for operational risk), they are not intended to introduce a signiﬁcant change, up or
down, in the aggregate level of capital held by banks. Thus, the committee emphasizes in its
summary results the degree of change, or lack thereof, from the current minimum capital
requirements.
The results from QIS 3 indicate that, for the G-10 Group 1 banks, the overall capital charge would
rise somewhat for banks that use the standardized approach, but remain largely unchanged if the
IRB approach (either foundation or advanced) was used (Table 4).25 Banks implementing the IRB
approach experienced particularly large reductions in capital requirements on their retail
exposure, leading to an overall decline in the capital charge for credit risk. This was offset by the
new capital charge for operational risk. The impact can vary dramatically for individual banks,
owing to differences in portfolio composition (see the last two columns of Table 4). With respect
to the overall results, however, the committee concludes that “the framework as currently
calibrated produces capital requirements broadly consistent with the Committee’s objectives.”






a. QIS 1 was a relatively limited exercise used to inform the calibration of subsequent im-
pact studies.
July 2000 – –
2 April 2001 November 2001 138
2.5 November 2001 June 2002 38b
b. Although QIS 2.5 involved a smaller number of banks than QIS 2, it focused on those
that were among the largest and most internationally active.
3 October 2002 May 2003 365
25. The results are basedon Basel IIas it existed in late 2002. Actual results will change inline with
changes to Basel II.24
The results from the QIS studies do not allow us to assess the variation in capital requirements
that might be created by cyclical movements in credit quality over time. Each QIS, by design,
provides only a “snapshot” of the minimum capital requirements at a speciﬁc point in time. In
addition, given the committee’s objective of achieving a largely unchanged level of required
capital in aggregate, they have deliberately adjusted the criteria to meet this objective (with QIS 3,
for example, moving substantially closer than QIS 2, which was completed in 2001).
This highlights an important limitation of inferring the impact of the proposed Basel II accord
from the QIS studies. By design they are static analyses. They do not show the sensitivity of the
capital charges to variations over time in the riskiness of bank portfolios. Furthermore, they do not
capture the induced behavioural response of banks (in terms of the assets they will hold in their
portfolios) to the changed (and changing over time) incentives created by Basel II. The
counterfactual analyses of the Canadian banking system provided in later sections of this paper
address the ﬁrst concern, demonstrating the change in capital levels in response to historical
changes over time in the riskiness of assets, but they do not capture the induced behavioural
impact of Basel II.
A second concern is that the state of the cycle will affect the calibration of the capital calculation
formulae in Basel II. If, for example, the Basel formulae are being calibrated to achieve an 8 per
cent minimum capital requirement at a time when credit quality is worse than normal, then
presumably the calibration parameters will have to be adjusted accordingly; i.e., set at “easier”
levels, in order not to exceed the 8 per cent target, despite poor credit quality. This, in turn, implies
that, owing to the risk sensitivity inherent in the Basel Accord, over the entire cycle the average
required level of capital will be lower than 8 per cent (the reverse would be true if the formula
were calibrated at a time of better-than-average credit quality). The four QIS studies were
initiated between mid-2000 and late-2002, a period of declining credit quality. Indeed, the recent






Standardized 11 0 10 84 –15
IRB foundation 3 –7 10 55 –32
IRB advanced –2 –13 11 46 –36
Source: BIS (2003b, page 3, Table 1)25
cyclical low in credit quality was reached at roughly the time of QIS 3. The recent cycle in credit
quality is discussed further in section 6.
6. Recent Developments in the Credit Cycle
The recent cycle in credit quality provides a useful period upon which to test the effects of Basel II.
Over the period 2001–02, corporations experienced a marked deterioration in credit quality, both
globally and within Canada. The diverse factors that contributed to this included the bursting of the
“bubble” in equity prices beginning in 2002 (particularly for stocks in the hi-tech sectors);
revelations of questionable corporate accounting and governance practices, which damaged
investor confidence in financial statements and led to a reassessment of the financial strength of a
number of corporations;26 heightened geopolitical concerns following the 11 September terrorist
attacks in the United States; and sluggish global economic growth.
In this environment of increased uncertainty, changing perceptions of risk associated with financial
assets and declining investor willingness to take on risk (i.e., rising risk aversion) contributed to
the movements in equity and bond prices. Spreads on high-yield (i.e., relatively risky) bonds,
another indicator of credit quality, rose particularly sharply (Figure 11). The most recent period
therefore provides an important “stress test,” allowing us to assess the impact of a significant “real
world” variation in credit quality on bank capital under the rules outlined in Basel II.
26. Enron, for example, declared bankruptcy in December 2001.














Figure 11: Canadian Corporate Credit Spreads
Source: Merrill Lynch (2004)26
Rated bond issues provide the external credit ratings that are used in the standardized approach,
and which might possibly be used to proxy the IRB approach. Outstanding Canadian bond
issuance rose steadily through the 1980s and 1990s, ﬂattening in 2002 as issuance slowed in
response to deteriorating credit conditions and perhaps reduced demand for funds. The proportion
of corporate bond issuers assigned a credit rating by rating agencies has risen. Moody’s (Hamilton
and Ou 2003), for example, rated 51 Canadian corporate bond issuers in 1989, and 193 in 2002.
The value of rated issues over this period rose from $6.4 billion to $50.8 billion.
The severity of the latest cycle in credit quality is indicated by shifts in credit ratings and
developments regarding bond defaults and recovery rates. During periods of heightened ﬁnancial
stress, we would anticipate that the number of credit rating upgrades would diminish relative to
downgrades. Figure 12 shows that credit rating downgrades have increased markedly. Credit
rating drift, which summarizes the aggregate movement in credit ratings, has moved in the
direction of lower overall ratings. Globally, the percentage of issuers downgraded reached record
highs in 2001 and 2002 (based on Moody’s data). The deterioration in the rating of investment-
grade issues, while remaining much lower than for speculative-grade issues, was particularly
intense compared with earlier periods of declining credit quality.
The deteriorating trend in default rates during the current credit cycle is even more evident.
Globally, the dollar value of defaults rose sharply, well beyond earlier experience. The total value
of defaults on rated issues rose to US$163 billion (Moody’s data), and rated defaults in Canada
rose sharply to Can$14 billion.27 Rising defaults in absolute terms may simply be the result of an
27. In Canada, defaulted issues were heavily concentrated inthe telecommunications sector.

























Figure 12: Corporate Downgrades
(as a percentage of rating actions)
Source: Moody’s (2004)27
increase in the rated universe of bonds, such that default rates provide a better indication of the
likelihood of default. Although one must be cautious of small-sample properties, default rates in
Canada spiked upward in 2000–03, beyond that observed in earlier periods. A relatively large
proportion of “fallen angels,” issues moving from an investment grade to a speculative grade,
typiﬁes the current global cycle (Figure 13).
With respect to recovery rates, over the period 1989–2002, the average, dollar-weighted recovery
rate for Canadian bonds was 26 per cent, compared with 35 per cent for U.S. bonds. The smaller
sample size for Canadian bonds may explain part of this difference, although a heavy
concentration in telecommunications ﬁrms (telecoms) is also a factor. Excluding telecoms,
recovery rates in Canada and the United States are similar. The 1999–2002 period heavily
inﬂuences these ﬁgures, given the cyclically high default rates and cyclically low recovery rates
(Table 5).
As discussed above, the historical propensity for bonds with a particular credit rating to be shifted
to another rating over a speciﬁed time horizon, or to fall into default, can be summarized within a
transition matrix (section 7.3 describes transition matrices in detail). Over a one-year horizon,
most issues will tend to retain their beginning rating at the end of the period. The available data,
however, suggest that downgrades and defaults become more prominent during periods of
macroeconomic weakness; i.e., they display cyclicality, which under Basel II has the potential to
be reﬂected in banks’ minimum capital requirements.
We use historical transition matrices to represent the evolution of credit ratings assigned to assets
in bank portfolios, against which the bank must hold capital. Of course, the bond assets that















Figure 13: Global Fallen Angels
(number of non-financial firms)
Source: Moody’s (2004)28
underpin the transition matrices are, at best, a rough proxy for the assets held by the domestic
banking system. In particular, under the standardized approach, many bank assets would not have
a rating, and would therefore be assigned a 100 per cent capital weight under the proposed rules.
Thus, the use of transition matrices can best be thought of as proxying the capital requirements for
a group of banks that are using the IRB approach; i.e., the banks are assigning internally derived
ratings to most of their assets in a manner that would be similar to what external credit rating
agencies would do (if they had assigned ratings to all bank assets). If we assume that LGD is
constant, then this would most closely simulate the foundation IRB approach. Note from the
above, however, that there is evidence that the recovery rates for bonds and bank loans are
correlated with default rates, which represents a potentially important additional source of
cyclicality.
7. Counterfactual Analysis of Basel II Minimum Capital
Requirements
In this section, we compute counterfactual capital requirements for Canadian banks’ wholesale
exposures over the 1984–2003 period using Basel II rules. While this approach captures the
impact of changes in the riskiness of banks’ asset portfolios based on historical data, an important
caveat is that these simulations do not allow for changes created by Basel II to the behavioural
response of banks (i.e., how the banks would modify their portfolios, initially and over time, in
response to a change in the regulatory regime). Sensitivity analysis, however, can provide some
insight into the potential behavioural impact.














United States 1379 39.5 35.2
Note: Based on estimates by Hamilton and Ou (2003) of bond prices in the secondary market one
month after the default date. The issue-weighted mean is the sum of each bond’s recovery rate divided
by the number of bond issues. The dollar-weighted mean is the sum of each bond’s face value multi-
plied by its recovery rate, divided by the sum of all face values.29
We apply the advanced IRB formulae discussed in section 3 to various hypothetical portfolios
based on Canadian banking system data. We focus on wholesale exposures, deﬁned as loans,
securities, and other claims on commercial and industrial ﬁrms, other banks, and sovereigns,
because these exposures contribute the most to banking system losses. Indeed, despite the decline
in wholesale exposures as a percentage of overall banking system assets, from 60 per cent in 1984
to 35 per cent in 2003, they still accounted for 94 per cent of losses, on average, over the 1994–
2003 period.28 Consequently, wholesale exposures are expected to generate the greatest variation
in Basel II required capital and provisions, and are thus of the greatest analytic interest.
The ﬁrst step in constructing counterfactual requirements is to estimate the credit quality of the
banks’ wholesale portfolios. These estimates provide us with the key credit-risk parameters
required for the Basel II capital formula. We describe two estimation techniques in the following
sections: one approximates a point-in-time ratings approach, and the other approximates a
through-the-cycle ratings approach. Sovereign exposures are discussed separately, because we are
able to provide more precise estimates of their credit quality. We input the exposures and risk
parameters into the Basel II expected and unexpected loss formulae and analyze the results under
different scenarios.
7.1 Estimating the credit quality of wholesale exposures
Canadian banks that opt to use ratings from external credit rating agencies will likely see little
change from the current rules of Basel I; because only rated borrowers will receive varying capital
treatment, and there are relatively few rated borrowers in Canada. For example, only about 200
Canadian corporations had bond ratings from either Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s, or DBRS in
2002 (Hamilton and Ou 2003). As a result, most Canadian commercial and industrial exposures
are to ﬁrms without external credit ratings.29 For the time being, therefore, the largest impact from
Basel II will be on banks that use internal ratings.30
Since the banks’ internal ratings are unknown, we must estimate the quality distribution of their
commercial and industrial, and interbank, exposures to calculate counterfactual capital
requirements. Data on exposures to individual sovereigns are available, however, so no estimation
is needed.31 The point-in-time approach is approximated by using market-implied ratings. The
28. Loan-lossallowancesformortgagesaccountformostoftheremainder.Ofthese,slightlyoverhalfare
fornon-residentialmortgages.Adetailedbreakdownoflossesbysectorpriorto1994isnotavailable.
However, 94 per cent likely represents a minimum, because residential mortgage losses as a share of
total losses peaked in 1995.
29. Slightly over52 percent of business loans in Canada have authorizations of under $5 million, a
threshold that is well below the size of loans typically rated by credit rating agencies.
30. On the other hand, most sovereignsand banks have externally available credit ratings.
31. Weassumethatbanks’internalcreditassessmentsofsovereignborrowersare,onaverage,thesameas
those from the major rating agencies.30
through-the-cycle approach is approximated by using ratings from the major credit rating
agencies. Our principal working assumption is that aggregate measures of credit quality are
broadly representative of the aggregate portfolios of chartered banks.
7.2 Market-implied estimates of credit quality
We consider two popular techniques used to estimate credit quality based on market data.32 The
ﬁrst approach is in the spirit of Cantor and Mann (2003), who translate the bond yield for a given
borrower into a credit rating. This “mapping” technique essentially involves minimizing the
squared difference between the bond yield and the average yield on bonds with known alpha-
numeric credit ratings (i.e., AAA, AA+, AA,..., C) of similar duration at each point in time.
This approach is equivalent to a through-the-cycle rating, since the mappings ﬂuctuate in tandem
with the cyclical movements in yields (and, therefore, risk weights change only when there is a
relative change in yields). In our case, we disaggregate the Canadian banks’ commercial and
industrial exposures into 17 sectors (interbank exposures are included in the “ﬁnancial services”
sector).33 We then map the market-weighted average yield on bonds in that sector (a proxy for
yields on overall bank claims) to an alphanumeric rating.34 For example, if the average yield on
bonds in the communications sector was 9 per cent in 2002, and this most closely matched the
average yield on BB-rated bonds, then exposures to the communications sector in 2002 would be
assigned a mean rating of BB. A similar exercise is carried out for sovereign borrowers.35
A second approach used to estimate credit quality based on market data follows Buckle,
Cunningham, and Davis (2000), who derive one-year expected credit losses from bond-yield
spreads with no adjustment for their cyclical ﬂuctuations. This is equivalent to a point-in-time
ratings approach. Speciﬁcally, assuming investors are risk neutral, the one-year no arbitrage
expected credit-loss (ECL) condition can be expressed as,
(5)
32. AthirdtechniqueistouseaMertonmodelofﬁrms’distance-to-defaultbasedontheirsharepricesand
balance-sheet data. We leave this approach to future work, given the signiﬁcant data requirements.
33. Chemicals, communications, multi-product conglomerates, construction, food processing, general
industrial, hotels and food service, metals, mining, pipelines, reﬁning, retail, miscellaneous services,
textiles, transportation and warehousing, utilities (non-gas, non-telecom), and ﬁnancial services.
34. In both cases, Merrill Lynch bond indices from Datastream are used.
35. If a sovereign bond yield isunavailable, we use the nearest comparable yield basedon credit rating,
geographical proximity,or economic similarity.
ECL b 1 r – () × yr – ()
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where b is the probability of default, r is the recovery rate, the numerator is the yield spread, and
the denominator is the gross yield. In the case of commercial and industrial, and interbank,
exposures, y is proxied by the average yield to maturity on bonds in each of the 17 sectors, where
the bonds have a median duration of ﬁve years.
In the case of exposures to emerging-market sovereigns, y is proxied by the U.S.-dollar-
denominated bond yield for each sovereign, or the closest available representative yield.36 In the
case of highly developed nations, a zero-yield spread is assumed (i.e., zero expected loss). Finally,
r is the risk-free rate proxied by the no-coupon benchmark 5-year government yield. Table A6 in
the appendix reports the results of applying this methodology to Canadian banks’ sovereign
exposures.
Yield spreads also incorporate non-credit risk factors, such as premiums for liquidity and market
risks, and the degree of investor risk aversion. These factors represent a proportionately larger
share of the total yield spread on investment-grade debt than on speculative-grade debt, resulting
in upwardly biased estimates of credit loss for high-quality borrowers. To adjust for these factors,
O’Kane, Schloegl, and Greenberg (2003) estimate non-credit risk spread premiums by
alphanumeric rating. The premium is equal to the difference between the actual spread and the
ECL based on actuarial loss. We use their approach to correct the ECL estimates from equation
(5). Note that the expected credit-loss measure implicitly incorporates a variable LGD, which is
permitted under the advanced IRB approach.
In the case of commercial and industrial, and interbank, exposures, the distribution about each
sector’s mean rating is unknown. Therefore, we experiment with several hypothetical distributions
that cover a plausible range of possibilities (Figure 14). If the quality of bank exposures is more or
less spread out evenly across the ratings spectrum, for example, then the uniform distribution
would be a fair approximation. It is more likely, however, that credit quality is clustered around
one or more particular rating categories. In this case, either the normal, skewed-left, skewed-right,
or bimodal distributions would be a better approximation. The distribution of exposures could
also resemble the known distribution of Canadian bonds.37
36. For example, if a sovereign does not borrow in U.S. dollars, or if data are unavailable for a given year,
then we substitute the yield on debt that has the closest alphanumeric rating to the sovereign thatyear.
Table A7 in the appendix for a description of sovereign credit ratings.
37. For sovereign exposures, the distribution is known.32
In fact, based on current anecdotal evidence, the quality of Canadian bank exposures is roughly
normally distributed, with slightly less than one-third of the distribution within one rating notch of
BBB+, two-thirds within four notches, and 95 per cent within seven notches. Thus, a little more
than two-thirds of bank exposures would be rated investment grade (i.e., BBB– or higher), as
shown in the “normal” column of Table 6. This corresponds roughly to the quality distribution of
corporate bonds in 2002.38 It also closely matches the portfolio distribution for “high-quality”
U.S. banks, according to a Federal Reserve Board (FRB) survey reported by Catarineu-Rabell,
Jackson, and Tsomocos (2003). That survey also reported a distribution for “average-quality”
U.S. banks, which is close to our hypothetical “skewed-right” distribution.39
If banks target a higher or lower average-quality borrower in the future, then the distribution will
become skewed. Table 6 reports a “skewed-left” distribution that has a median portfolio rating of
A2, with 78 per cent of exposures rated investment grade. The “skewed-right” distribution has a
median portfolio rating of BB, with 41 per cent rated investment grade. Alternatively, the market
may be segmented such that there are clusters of high- and low-quality borrowers, or risk-averse
and risk-taking lenders. In these situations, a bimodal distribution may be a better approximation
(not shown in the table). A possibility that we do not consider is a time-dependent distribution.
For example, the rating distribution of ﬁrms seeking credit may be skewed left during an
38. Moody’s data are based on the number of issuers, rather than dollar volumes, which exaggerates the
weight on the B and Ccategories.
39. The Basel Committee (BIS 2001) reports that the average distribution of commercial and industrial
bankloansinindustrializedcountriesissplitbetween20percentAcredits,19percentBandpast-due
















Figure 18: Hypothetical Distributions of Loan Ratings
Source: Hamilton and Ou (2003) and authors’ calculations
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Figure 14: Hypothetical Distributions of Loan Ratings33
economic boom and skewed right during a recession. In our counterfactual scenarios, we assume
that new exposures have the same distribution as the original portfolio.
7.3 Estimates of credit quality from credit ratings ﬁltered through transition
matrices
Rating-transition matrices provide an alternative approach to estimating the historical evolution of
credit quality. A transition matrix maps the evolution of a portfolio’s debt ratings over a given
time horizon. We apply a sequence of one-year transition matrices, starting in 1983 and ending in
2003, to the 17 sectoral portfolios. The initial distributions of the portfolios have to be estimated
(as above), but the subsequent distributions are based on the transition probabilities. Each element
of each matrix is computed as,
(6)

















AAA 16 3 3 3 3 4 3
AA 35 16 18 9 9 6 5
A2 7 2 4 3 8 1 9 1 0 2 9 1 3
BBB 14 27 19 38 19 36 29
BB 2 11 10 19 38 21 35
B 6 14 9 9 18 3 12
C0 5 3 3 3 1 3
Investment grade 92 70 78 69 41 75 50
Speculative grade 8 30 22 31 69 25 50
Median rating AA BBB A BBB BB BBB BB
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=Source: Hamilton and Ou (2003), by number of ﬁnancial and non-ﬁnancial corporate bond issuers (dollar
volume not available)
*Source: Catarineu-Rabell, Jackson, and Tsomocos (2003), by dollar volume of corporate loans34
where P is the probability at time t of having rating R, n is the number of rated issuers, a is the 17-
point alphanumeric ratings vector [AAA, AA+, AA,..., B, B–, C], and b is the same vector with an
additional default (D) element.40
Exposures that transition to default (D) are assumed to be replaced in the following year by new
exposures with the same distribution as the portfolio (the bracketed term in equation (7)).
Therefore, the estimated value of exposures (V) in year t for sector j, with a sectoral portfolio
growth rate of g, and having a rating of b, is,
(7)
Hamilton and Ou (2003) calculate transition matrices for Canadian corporate bonds for the 1989–
2002 period, which we use as a proxy for the transition matrices of bank exposures in general.
These matrices have low statistical power, because they are based on very few observations in the
initial years, but they are nevertheless remarkably similar to U.S. corporate transition matrices.
Therefore, for missing years, we iteratively estimate Canadian matrices using the available U.S.
matrices subject to six constraints: (1) the sum of the probabilities of transitioning to a lower
rating equals the observed downgrade ratio for Canada; (2) similarly, the sum of the probabilities
of transitioning to a higher rating equals the observed upgrade ratio of Canada; (3) the sum of the
probabilities of defaulting equals the Canadian default rate; (4) the probability of retaining the
same credit rating equals 1 minus the probability of transitioning based on the above constraints;
(5) all probabilities lie in the interval (0,1); and (6) the sum of all probabilities in a given row of
each matrix equals 1. These constraints are illustrated for a stylized transition matrix in Figure 15.
40. Transition matrices also typically include a “withdrawn” category.The probability of a withdrawal
increases at lower rating levels, often because ﬁrms wish to avoid a downgrade. We have chosen to
reallocate the probability of withdrawal (usually around 4–8 per cent) to the other categories.
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Figure 15: Interpolating Transition Probabilities for Years with Missing Data Points
We consider two Canada-speciﬁc default rate series: one based on Canadian bond defaults, the
other based on Canadian bank loans data. The latter are estimated by dividing aggregate bank
provisions for wholesale exposures by a historical time-varying recovery rate.41 As is the case
with U.S. and global transition matrices, the Canadian matrices exhibit a small downward ratings
“drift” over time (i.e., downgrades have exceeded upgrades over this period). Nevertheless, even
for very low quality distributions, the drift in mean credit ratings amounts to only one rating notch
after 20 years.
7.4 Sovereign exposures: Estimates of credit quality from credit ratings
In the case of sovereign exposures, we use the actual ratings over history, rather than transition
matrices. The availability of sovereign credit ratings has increased dramatically over the past
15 years (Table A7 in the appendix). Emerging-market economy (EME) sovereign ratings,
however, were scarce in the early part of our reference period. As a result, only 34 per cent of
Canadian banks’ sovereign exposures on a dollar-weighted basis were to countries that already
had external credit ratings in 1984 (Table A5 in the appendix). By 1990, however, fewer than
41. Thetime-varyingrecoveryrateisbasedontheaveragepriceofdefaultedU.S.bondsmeasured30days
afterdefault.HamiltonandOu(2003)reportthatthehistoricalrecoveryrateforCanadianbondsisnot
























(6) S = 1
(5) p
' (0,1)
(1) S = downgrade ratio
(4) Si,j = 1- [ (1)i,j  + (2)i,j  + (3)i,j  ]
(2) S = upgrade ratio
(3) S = default rate36
10 per cent of exposures were unrated. Therefore, from 1990 onwards, our estimates of the credit
quality of the Canadian banks’ sovereign exposures are largely data-determined.
7.5 The treatment of expected and unexpected losses
As discussed in section 3.3, expected and unexpected portfolio losses will have to be offset with
minimum provisions and capital, respectively. We have chosen to report combined results for
required capital and provisions, because a shortfall in provisions will have to be capitalized under
Basel II. Although the tax treatment of, and the mix of securities that will be eligible to meet, any
shortfall in provisions will be different, both provisioning and required capital represent a burden
on earnings. The combination of the two requirements does not qualitatively alter the results,
because both losses move largely in tandem. In fact, the quantitative results are not substantially
different, because the expected loss component is relatively small compared with that for
unexpected loss. To make a fair comparison between effective Basel I and Basel II requirements,
therefore, we add provisions for defaulted claims to the reported Basel I requirements. Thus, we
consider the total burden on earnings of both regimes.
7.6 Counterfactual capital and provisions requirements based on credit
quality
We can now estimate what the required capital and provisions on Canadian banks’ wholesale
exposures would have been over the past 20 years if Basel II had been in effect. Table 7 reports the
results for a “base-case” portfolio using through-the-cycle and point-in-time risk assessments. As
one would expect, the results depend heavily on the assumptions made above. We therefore
conduct a variety of sensitivity analyses. As a general rule, we err on the side of prudence by
making conservative assumptions such that our estimates are, if biased at all, biased slightly
upward and towards less variability.
For the purposes of this paper, the aggregate commercial and industrial portfolio includes
exposures to small and medium-sized (SME) ﬁrms, even though these exposures will attract
slightly lower regulatory capital than exposures to large ﬁrms of comparable credit quality.42
Loans with authorizations of under $1 million, which is an approximation for SME exposures,
represented 21.1 per cent of commercial and industrial exposures at year-end 2002. If we have
made the correct assumption about the credit-quality distribution of the aggregate portfolio, then
42. The risk of their exposure toSME ﬁrms isconsidered to be more idiosyncratic (i.e., less correlated
with other assets). Thus, the relief comes from reducingr via equation (2). Exposures to SMEs are
deﬁned under Basel II as ﬁrms that have sales less than e50 million. (Certain other measures may be
used if sales volumes do notaccurately reﬂect the size of the business.)37
including the SME exposures will bias our results upward slightly. However, uncertainty about
the true distribution, which can go in either direction, likely outweighs the loss of precision by
treating these exposures identically.
As discussed at the beginning of section 3, required capital and provisions will also depend on the
average maturity of the loans and the expected LGD. Asterisks in Table 7 indicate how robust the
results are to changes in these assumptions. Each asterisk indicates how many changes to the
maturity and LGD assumptions one has to make, in increments of six months and 10 percentage
points, respectively, for the counterfactual Basel II capital ratio to exceed that of Basel I. For
example, one asterisk (*) means that the requirement under Basel II would be greater if we
assumed a 3-year average portfolio maturity (rather than 2.5 years), ceteris paribus, or an LGD of
55 per cent (rather than 45 per cent).
Table 7: Basel II Counterfactual Capital Ratios
(includes required provisions and operational risk charge)
We use the basic indicator approach to calculate an operational risk charge. Although details of
this method have yet to be ﬁnalized, the current basic formula suggests that 15 per cent of the
3-year moving average of gross income should be held as capital to offset operational risk. On the
Shaded cells indicate that the Basel II requirement would be higher than the Basel I capital requirement (including pro-





Basel II counterfactual capital ratios
(% of exposures)
1984 1989 1993 2003




6.6*** 4.3*** 5.6*** 5.2**




6.7 10.2*** 4.9** 1.9*
Point-in-time 5.7 6.8*** 3.2 1.6
Memorandum item:
Actual banking system capital plus total
general and speciﬁc provisions as a percentage
of total assets
6.5 8.1 8.5 6.5
*** Robust to three or more incremental changes in LGD or maturity assumptions
**   Robust to two or more incremental changes in LGD or maturity assumptions
*     Robust to one incremental change in LGD or maturity assumptions
Notes: The comparison is based on Basel I requirement plus general and specific provisions for the given year. Basel I
requirements are estimated prior to 1988. Basel II ratios include required capital for unexpected loss, required provisions
for expected loss, and an operational charge as per the basic indicator approach outlined in BIS (2003d).
The base-case scenario uses a normally distributed commercial and industrial, and interbank, portfolio with an initial median
rating of BBB+ and a time-varying default rate that is consistent with historical Canadian bank loan losses. The base case uses
the actual aggregate sovereign portfolio and default rate.38
margin, the moving-average component of this method adds to the cyclicality of capital
requirements, because income is procyclical. However, the variation over the cycle is small
enough in absolute terms that it does not meaningfully affect our results.
Figure 16 illustrates how the capital ratio can vary by changing the assumed median quality of the
portfolio using a through-the-cycle ratings approach. (Our base-case commercial and industrial,
and interbank, portfolio is normally distributed with an initial median rating of BBB+.) One
interesting result is that the evolution of the portfolio over the cycle can still result in level shifts
that are greater than the initial-level differences between the variously rated portfolios. A possible
implication of this cyclical effect is that banks may not be able to contain their capital
requirements during recessions, even if they dramatically shift their portfolios towards higher-
rated exposures.
This result is even stronger if we consider a point-in-time ratings approach. Figure 17 contrasts
the evolution of required capital and provisions for Canadian banks’ wholesale portfolios using
through-the-cycle and point-in-time ratings approaches. Both assume a BBB+ median-rated
portfolio.The steep increase from 3.9 per cent in 1997 to 9.2 per cent in 2002 is indicative of the
considerable scope within the Basel II framework for required capital and provisions to vary with
the cycle. Recall that our point-in-time approach is based on bond market-implied credit risk. An
approach based on equity prices, such as a Merton-based model, would have likely produced a
similar swing in requirements. It is hard to imagine, therefore, that any bank will choose to rely
solely on point-in-time ratings to compute their requirements.















Per cent of portfolio
Figure 16: Basel I versus "Through-the-Cycle" Basel II
Canadian banks’ C&I, and interbank, portfolios
Basel I ratio includes capital plus general and specific provisions.
Basel II ratio includes required capital for unexpected loss, required specific
provisions for expected loss, and an operational risk charge.








Another interesting result is that counterfactual required capital and provisions were at cyclical
highs in 2002, according to both approaches. One may wish to treat the results from QIS 3 with
some caution, therefore, since they were calculated using 2002 parameters. In particular, the
banks’ own estimates of the impact of Basel II may well have been lower had the exercise been
carried out at a different point in the cycle.
Using a through-the-cycle approach, the counterfactual capital requirements for commercial and
industrial, and interbank, loans would be lower under Basel II than under Basel I, ranging from
35 per cent lower for our base case to 45 per cent lower under optimistic assumptions. Using a
point-in-time approach, the base case produces a counterfactual requirement that is comparable
with that in Basel I. Kiesel, Perraudin, and Taylor (2003), who use a credit VAR measure of
economic capital applied to representative U.S. bank portfolios, report even lower capital ratios:
between 60 per cent lower for high-quality portfolios and 38 per cent lower for mid-quality
portfolios. French (2004), using a broadly similar approach to ours for U.S. banks, ﬁnds average
reductions of between 14 and 29 per cent.
The results are also quite robust to increases in the maturity and LGD assumptions (as shown by
the prevalence of two and three asterisks in Table 7). Even under “low-quality” portfolio scenarios
(not shown here), the counterfactual capital requirements would generally be lower.
Using a point-in-time approach (i.e., implied credit risk), capital requirements would have
increased markedly in the 1990s, and been greater in 2002 than under the through-the-cycle
approach. This is because certain sectors to which the banks were heavily exposed experienced
large deteriorations in credit quality, coinciding with a downturn in the business cycle (e.g.,
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"Point-in-time"
Figure 17: Simulated Basel II Ratios
Canadian banks’ C&I, and interbank, portfolios
Both ratios include required capital for unexpected loss, required specific
provisions for expected loss, and an operational risk charge.
A median portfolio rating of BBB+, and an LGD of 45 per cent, are assumed.




construction in the early 1990s and communications in the early 2000s). As a result, not only did
their relative credit quality deteriorate, but also their absolute credit quality, which accounts for
the divergence of the through-the-cycle and point-in-time approaches.
The results for sovereign exposures suggest that Basel II capital ratios would have been generally
higher than capital requirements under Basel I, including country-specific provisions (Figure 18).
Owing to large writedowns of LDC loans, however, which had been doubtful or effectively non-
performing for several years prior, the Basel I ratio, including specific provisions, jumped to 23 per
cent in 1987 and 26 per cent in 1989. Some of these writedowns were later recovered. The
counterfactual Basel II requirements were higher leading up to the writedowns, reflecting the
relatively high degree of credit risk. The secular decline in capital ratios for sovereign exposures
over the past 14 years reflects the rising share of U.S. government claims, which have a zero risk
weight in all four cases, and the declining share of exposures to riskier sovereigns in general.43
In summary, it appears that the level of required capital for Canadian banks’ commercial and
industrial, and interbank, exposures will be lower under Basel II, except perhaps during economic
downturns if they adopt credit rating methodologies with strong point-in-time characteristics. The
level of required capital for sovereign exposures will likely be higher than under Basel I, although
most of the difference can be explained by the charge for operational risk. Perhaps a more
43. There is a weakly positive relationship between the change in the claims on a given sovereign and the
changeinitsbond-yieldspreadoritsexternalcreditrating,whichsuggeststhat,withinthenon-OECD
category, Canadian banks have generally shifted their portfolios to less-risky sovereignsover time.
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Basel II (Moody’s ratings)
Basel II (S&P ratings)
Basel II (market-implied ratings)
Figure 18: Basel I versus Basel II
Canadian banks’ sovereign portfolios
*Basel I ratio includes capital plus country-specific provisions.
 Basel II ratio includes required capital for unexpected loss, required specific
 provisions for expected loss, and an operational risk charge.
 Sources: BIS (2003d), Moody’s (2004), and Standard and Poor’s (2004), and authors’ calculations41
interesting question, however, is whether the proposed capital requirements will be signiﬁcantly
more volatile and cyclical than under Basel I.
8. VolatilityofCounterfactualCapitalRequirementsunderBaselII
The capital requirements under Basel II are designed to be risk-sensitive, and therefore have the
potential to be more volatile than under Basel I. Moreover, since downgrades, risky yields, and
defaults (Cantor, Mahoney, and Mann 2003), as well as bank loan losses, are countercyclical, we
might expect Basel II capital to be countercyclical (i.e., increase during recessions).
Table 8 illustrates the standard deviation of Basel I and II capital ratios under several of the more
interesting scenarios we consider. Basel II capital ratios for commercial and industrial, and
interbank, loans appear to be more volatile under a point-in-time ratings approach, but not
substantially more variable under a through-the-cycle approach. Note that the mean level of
required capital for sovereigns is not stationary over the sample period, owing to the shift out of
riskier sovereign exposures discussed earlier. Thus, the standard deviations for sovereign
exposures are not reported.
Table 9 reports the average absolute annual change in required capital as a percentage of pre-tax
proﬁts. This is a more economically meaningful measure of volatility, since banks primarily build
capital through retained earnings. Because the absolute level of counterfactual Basel II capital is
Table 8: Volatility of Counterfactual Capital
(includes required provisions and operational risk charge)
Portfolio Portfolio quality











A-median 0.39 0.44 1.49
Baa-median 0.60 0.65 1.80
Ba-median 0.86 0.96 2.71
Memorandum item:
Observed standard deviation of Canadian banks’ loss buffers=                            0.90
*Basel I requirements are estimated prior to 1988. Basel II ratios include capital for unexpected loss, required provisions
for expected loss, and an operational charge as per the basic indicator approach outlined in BIS (2003d).
=Loss buffers are calculated as total actual eligible capital plus provisions.42
considerably lower, it is not surprising that the changes in capital relative to earnings are also
generally smaller than under Basel I. As one would expect, lower-quality portfolios and market-
implied risk-based capital approaches are more volatile in terms of earnings.
Counterfactual requirements for sovereign exposures are considerably less volatile than under
Basel I if we include provisions for impaired exposures: the level of capital required by Basel I
would have been insufﬁcient to cover the losses generated by the large increase in impaired
sovereign loans in the late 1980s (recall that Basel I had not yet been implemented, so these, too,
are counterfactual results). Consequently, the losses would have had to have been absorbed
through provisions, which indeed was the case. In contrast, the level of required capital and
provisions under Basel II rules would have been higher leading up to the sovereign loan defaults,
and would have thus absorbed the losses with a less-pronounced impact on capital. The higher
level under Basel II reﬂects the fact that, according to publicly available credit ratings at the time,
the sovereign exposures posed a high degree of credit risk. Under this counterfactual scenario,
therefore, Basel II rules dampen ﬂuctuations in capital.
The actual volatility of capital observed over this period was somewhat higher than the estimated
volatility in all the through-the-cycle scenarios, and in all but one (somewhat unlikely) point-in-
time scenario. This suggests that the impact of Basel II on earnings may be no greater than the
impact of other phenomena over the past 20 years.
Table 9: Volatility of Counterfactual Capital Relative to Earnings














A-median 39 22 43
Baa-median 50 33 47
Ba-median 61 43 132
Sovereign exposures 16 3 3
Memorandum items:
Average absolute annual change of actual capital as a % of pre-tax proﬁts
a. Pro-rated for the size of the commercial and industrial, and interbank, portfolio
b. Pro-rated for the size of the sovereign portfolio
38
6
Note: The comparison is based on Basel I requirements plus general and speciﬁc provisions for the given year.
Basel I requirements are estimated prior to 1988. Basel II ratios include capital for unexpected loss, required
provisions for expected loss, and an operational charge as per the basic indicator approach outlined in BIS (2003d).43
Table 10 reports the correlation between the year-over-year percentage growth rates in GDP and
required capital and provisions. The requirements under both Basel I and II are negatively
correlated with the economic cycle. The correlations for the combined Basel I measure, however,
are not signiﬁcant at the 90 per cent level for commercial and industrial, and interbank, exposures.
The signiﬁcant positive correlation of 42 per cent for sovereign exposures under Basel I is
spurious, because it is largely driven by the previously mentioned LDC writedowns. The
writedowns happened to coincide with the peak of the 1980s economic expansion in Canada,
hence the positive correlation.
The signiﬁcant and negative correlation of Basel II capital requirements and GDP is largely due to
the unexpected loss component. The expected loss requirements are negatively correlated with the
economic cycle, but not at a statistically signiﬁcant level (on the other hand, the expected loss
component is more volatile in terms of earnings). Although the point-in-time ratings approach
yields requirements that are more volatile, they are not more correlated with the economic cycle.
Also note that the correlation based on the actual growth rate of capital over this period is of
roughly the same magnitude. Again, this suggests that the impact of Basel II may be no greater
than other phenomena observed over the past 20 years.
Table 10: Correlation of Counterfactual Capital and GDP















A-median –7 –29* –23
Baa-median 0 –31* –26
Ba-median –3 –27 –24
Sovereign exposures 42** –17 –32*
Memorandum items:
Correlation between changes in actual level of capital and GDP (%) –24
Note: Asterisks denote statistically significant at the 90% (*), 95% (**), and 99% (***) confidence levels.
The test statistic for the correlation coefficient is r [n/(1-r2)]1/2,    ~t(0,s).
The comparison is based on Basel I requirements plus general and specific provisions for the given year. Basel I require-
ments are estimated prior to 1988. Basel II ratios include capital for unexpected loss, required provisions for expected
loss, and an operational charge as per the basic indicator approach outlined in BIS (2003d).44
9. Conclusions
Based on a counterfactual application of the advanced internal ratings-based rules under the new
Basel Capital Accord (Basel II), which will provide banks with the greatest ﬂexibility in
calculating their capital requirements, we ﬁnd that required capital and provisions for Canadian
banks’ commercial and industrial, and interbank, exposures could fall by 35 per cent. Conversely,
requirements for sovereign exposures could increase by 45 per cent, albeit from very low levels.
The combined effect would be a reduction in overall required capital and provisions for banks’
wholesale portfolios in the order of 30 per cent, under certain assumptions.
These identiﬁed reductions in capital required under Basel II would be only partly offset by the
new, additional, capital charge for operational risk. Note that the aggregate reduction in required
capital, relative to Basel I, persists even during periods of signiﬁcant deterioration in credit
quality, such as the marked deterioration in corporate credit quality that occurred in 2001–02.44
This reduction is in contrast to the most recent quantitative impact study (QIS 3), which produced
a result showing that banks’ aggregate capital requirement under Basel II is essentially unchanged
from that under Basel I.45 Ultimately, however, the required level of capital within the banking
system will be determined by national authorities. In Canada, current national minimum standards
are well above those that appear to result from Basel II.
From the perspective of macroeconomic policy, however, the more important issue is potentially
the volatility introduced into capital requirements, and ultimately into bank lending. Our
counterfactual analysis demonstrates the change in bank capital levels in response to historical
changes in the level and distribution of bank assets, although, by deﬁnition, it does not capture the
behavioural changes that would be induced by the different incentives under Basel II (to some
extent, however, sensitivity analysis can indicate the potential behavioural impact). We ﬁnd that
required capital could be more volatile than under Basel I. The increase is greater the lower the
quality of the banks’ loan portfolio, and the greater the tendency of banks to evaluate credit
quality with a point-in-time approach versus a through-the-cycle approach (recall Figure 17 and
Table 8). In one example, using a medium-quality portfolio and a point-in-time approach,
required capital would have more than doubled between 1997 and 2002.
If the increased risk sensitivity in Basel II produces changes in required capital that are
unacceptable to the banks, they may try to mitigate this by adjusting their lending (reducing it
44. Thismaynotbethecase,however,ifbanksweretoapplyamoreaggressivepoint-in-timeapproachto
calculating capital requirements.
45. It is important to recall that one of the objectives of Basel II is tomaintain the same minimum capital
requirement (of 8 per cent)as Basel I, even while increasing sensitivity to risk.45
during periods of deteriorating credit quality), or by adjusting the quality distribution of their
portfolio (shifting towards higher-quality assets). They may also choose to increase their buffer
capital (the amount of actual capital held in excess of the regulatory minimum). Thus, the actual
observed volatility in capital may not change signiﬁcantly once Basel II is implemented, but
perhaps only because banks are adjusting their loan portfolios accordingly. This is precisely the
procyclical behaviour that concerns policy-makers.
Several factors may mitigate the potential impact of Basel II on the cyclical behaviour of capital.
Substantial cyclicality is already present in the banking system. Indeed, the actual volatility of
bank capital over the 1984–2002 period was already high compared with our base-case scenario
and most of the alternatives examined, suggesting that other phenomena are also important factors
inﬂuencing volatility in bank capital. Nevertheless, to the extent that the volatility in Basel II is
additive to existing sources of volatility in bank capital, concern remains over the potential impact
on capital. For most of the scenarios examined, however, volatility in capital as a percentage of
pre-tax proﬁts was essentially the same for Basel I and II.
Our analysis also shows that much depends on precisely how banks calculate their capital
requirements, which will be inﬂuenced by accounting and tax regimes that vary across countries.
Our expectation is that they would tend towards a through-the-cycle approach, although it
effectively reduces the short-term sensitivity to changes in risk. The requirements of Basel II also
appear to leave banks, in aggregate, with substantial buffer stocks of capital. To the extent that
they are able and willing to allow the magnitude of these buffer stocks to vary through the cycle,
as determined by the supervisory authorities, this could reduce the impact of volatility in required
capital.
Indeed, much could depend on precisely how supervisory authorities choose to implement the
requirements of Basel II. One would expect that banks opting to implement the advanced IRB
approach to the calculation of capital (assuming they satisfy the necessary requirements) will
typically do so because it provides them with potential efﬁciency gains, owing to lower required
levels of capital (as deﬁned by Basel II) than otherwise. If banks are allowed to offset any increase
in volatility that arises from using the advanced IRB approach by allowing greater variation in the
remaining buffer stocks of capital (such that the volatility of capital is higher, but its average level
is lower, than previously), then, even under adverse scenarios, there may be very little induced
cyclicality in lending via this channel.46
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Appendix: Statistical Properties of Historical Banking System and
Economic Data
Tables A1 and A2 show the results of unit-root tests on key macroeconomic and ﬁnancial
variables, such as equity to assets (a simple capital ratio), loan-loss provisions to assets (a proxy
for the portfolio loss ratio), and bankruptcy liabilities to GDP (a measure of overall credit risk).
The tests are divided into full sample and post-World War II. The results indicate that most
macroeconomic and banking system variables are random walks integrated of order 1; therefore,
their ﬁrst-differences are used in subsequent empirical tests that require stationarity. This also
holds true using quarterly data, where available. As a caveat, the power of unit-root tests
diminishes when there are structural breaks in the data, which is almost certainly the case here.
This means that we may have falsely rejected stationarity in the levels of certain variables, and are
thus losing some information.
Pairwise Granger causality tests are performed to evaluate the timing of the relationships among
these variables. If lagged values of a variable contain statistically signiﬁcant information about
another variable, over and above its own lagged values, then the former is said to Granger cause
the latter. Note that Granger causality can run in both directions. A shaded entry in Table A3 or
Table A4 indicates that the variable in the left column Granger causes the variable in the top row
(all variables are log differenced).
At the annual frequency, a weighted average of world crude-oil prices contains the most leading
information about the other variables considered, including real bank capital, and can thus be
interpreted as the most exogenous variable to the system. The only other variables found to
Granger cause either bank capital or the capital ratio are the Toronto stock market (TSX) index
and the term spread. At the quarterly frequency, these also contain leading information about the
capital ratio, as do the components of the capital ratio itself (i.e., bank capital and assets).
We can reject Granger causality from real output to the capital ratio at any level of conﬁdence
below 10 per cent. In turn, the capital ratio contains only leading information about real bank
proﬁts at an annual frequency. Thus, pairwise Granger causality tests suggest that there is no
direct causal relationship between real output growth and changes in the capital ratio or the
growth rate of capital. Output growth and changes in the capital ratio, however, are negatively50
correlated (–0.26). Furthermore, output does Granger cause quarterly asset growth, which will
help explain the dynamics of the vector autoregression (VAR) discussed below.
The Granger causality tests provide several other interesting results. Real business bankruptcy
liabilities and oil prices contain signiﬁcant leading information about bank proﬁts. Similarly, real
bank asset growth Granger causes consumer, house, and oil price inﬂation. Bank provisioning for
loan losses appears to be unrelated to any of the other phenomena considered.
Alternatively, the relationship between bank capital and the macroeconomy can be analyzed
through a VAR framework. A reduced-form unconstrained VAR is constructed to quantify the
historical relationship in Canada between growth in real GDP (y), changes in the short-term
interest rate (r), and growth in the capital ratio (k) of banks. The relationship is estimated using
annual data over the 1874–2002 period, and quarterly data from 1946Q1 to 2002Q4. Both sets of
results produce very similar impulse-response functions under a one standard-deviation shock to
the system (Figures A and B). The Cholesky factor of the residual covariance matrix is used to
orthogonalize the impulses, imposing the ordering of y, r, k. This ordering is based on the results
of the Granger causality results, even though, a priori, one might have expected y to be the most
endogenous variable. Nevertheless, the ordering does not turn out to have a signiﬁcant effect on
the responses. Plus and minus two standard-deviation conﬁdence bands are also plotted (shaded
region).
The key result is that output appears to be invariant to the capital ratio. This can be seen from the
non-signiﬁcant response of y to k. On the other hand, the capital ratio has tended to fall
subsequent to positive economic shocks (k response to y) over a one-year horizon. The
explanation is that bank assets tend to grow more rapidly than capital during economic
expansions, and to contract more rapidly during recessions. Therefore, whether banks have
intentionally reduced credit during downturns to maintain their capital ratios, this evidence
suggests that banks have played a passive role in the Canadian economy over history. The capital
ratio has typically risen following a positive real interest rate shock. The output and interest rate
responses are standard: shocks to real output have tended to be persistent and put upward pressure
on real short-term interest rates, while increases in the short-term interest rate have tended to
depress output.
In summary, although these are rather simple tests, they suggest that there is only weak-to-little
historical evidence in Canada that either the level or growth rate of bank capital has inﬂuenced or
been inﬂuenced by broader macroeconomic phenomena.51
Table A1: Unit-Root Tests (full sample)
Most of the raw data are integrated of order 1. This table reports unit-root test statistics for the annual log dif-
ferences of the series, based on their full-sample range. The transformed series are integrated of order zero at
the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) significance level. If no star appears, it means that higher-order integration
may be present. The Schwartz information criterion is used to select the optimum lag length for both the aug-
mented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic and the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock (ERS) point optimal test statistic.
The Newey-West bandwidth optimum lag truncation for the Phillips-Perron (PP) test statistic is reported.
Variable (annual, log, ﬁrst difference) Sample range ADF PP ERS
Real GDP 1870-2002 -6.47*** -6.54*** 0.41***
Nominal GDP 1870-2002 -4.91*** -4.28*** 0.50***
GDP deﬂator 1870-2002 -8.37*** -8.70*** 0.49***
CPI 1850-2002 -9.44*** -9.65*** 0.45***
Long-term government bond yielda
a. Level differences
b. Long-term government bond yield minus 3-month commercial paper rate (proxied with U.S. data)
Sources: Bank of Canada (1950–2004); Curtis (1931); Energy Information Administration (2004); Leacy
(1983); NBER (2004); Statistics Canada (1974–2004); Urquhart (1986); and authors’ calculations.
1900-2002 -7.54*** -7.54*** 0.61***
Term spreada,b 1900-2002 -3.79*** -2.95** 2.63**
Toronto stock index 1914-2002 -7.25*** -7.25*** 0.76***
Banking sector stock index 1914-2002 -8.11*** -8.11*** 0.60***
Real average house price 1872-2002 -6.95*** -9.92*** 0.23***
Nominal average house price 1872-2002 -4.60*** -6.10*** 0.81***
Real bank assets 1856-2002 -3.82*** -8.27*** 1.76***
Nominal bank assets 1856-2002 -1.42 -2.94*** 6.70
Real bank equity 1856-2002 -8.94*** -9.46*** 0.48***
Nominal bank equity 1856-2002 -2.19** -4.75*** 2.43**
Real bank proﬁts 1929-2002 -11.2*** -11.12*** 1.07***
Nominal bank proﬁts 1929-2002 -3.05*** -9.78*** 1.54***
Real bank provisions for losses 1871-2002 -10.57*** -18.01*** 0.00***
Nominal bank provisions for losses 1871-2002 -9.92*** -25.62*** 0.04***
Real corporate proﬁts 1926-2002 -6.7*** -6.49*** 0.47***
Nominal corporate proﬁts 1926-2002 -3.46*** -5.88*** 0.22***
Real liabilities of bankrupt ﬁrms 1884-2002 -9.72*** -9.67*** 0.49***
Nominal liabilities of bankrupt ﬁrms 1884-2002 -3.59*** -9.6*** 4.38
Number of bankruptcies 1884-2002 -6.75*** -7.25*** 0.76***
Bank capital/assets 1856-2002 -8.83*** -9.02*** 2.48**
Bank provisions/assetsa 1871-2002 -3.8*** -2.17** 15.24
Bank provisions/capitala 1871-2002 -4.97*** -4.97*** 2.95***
Banking sector stock index/Toronto stock
index
1914-2002 -9.20*** -9.58*** 0.62***
Bankruptcy liabilities/GDP 1884-2002 -9.26*** -9.25*** 0.58***
Corporate proﬁts/GDP 1926-2002 -6.23*** -7.03*** 0.46***52
Table A2: Unit-Root Tests (post-World War II)
Most of the raw data are integrated of order 1. This table reports unit-root test statistics for the annual log dif-
ferences of the series, based on post-World War II Canadian data. The transformed series are integrated of
order zero at the 10% (*), 5% (**), or 1% (***) significance level. If no star appears, it means that higher-
order integration may be present. The Schwartz information criterion is used to select the optimum lag length
for both the augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistic and the Elliot-Rothenberg-Stock (ERS) point opti-
mal test statistic. The Phillips-Perron (PP) test statistic uses the Newey-West bandwidth optimum lag trunca-
tion.
Variable (annual, log, ﬁrst difference) Sample range ADF PP ERS
Real GDP 1946-2002 -3.51*** -6.02*** 9.80
Nominal GDP “ -4.13*** -4.19*** 3.73*
GDP deﬂator “ -3.28** -3.28** 1.74***
CPI “ -3.47** -3.48** 1.54***
Long-term government bond yielda “ -5.83*** -5.78*** 0.98***
Term spreada,b “ -4.57*** -2.96** 0.76***
Toronto stock index “ -6.96*** -6.96*** 1.28***
Banking sector stock index “ -6.98*** -7.12*** 2.37**
Real average house price “ -6.25*** -6.25*** 8.19
Nominal average house price “ -2.70*** -4.25*** 8.20
Real bank assets “ -5.11*** -5.10*** 1.13***
Nominal bank assets “ -4.05*** -3.96*** 1.59***
Real bank equity “ -5.87*** -6.05*** 1.23***
Nominal bank equity “ -2.45 -5.77*** 4.47
Real bank proﬁts “ -9.78*** -9.67*** 0.75***
Nominal bank proﬁts “ -2.65** -8.52*** 0.73***
Real bank provisions for losses “ -7.67*** -11.2*** 0.11***
Nominal bank provisions for losses “ -9.90*** -9.61*** 0.02***
Real corporate proﬁts “ -6.23*** -5.11*** 0.50***
Nominal corporate proﬁts “ -4.98*** -4.75*** 0.49***
Real liabilities of bankrupt ﬁrms “ -4.83*** -8.17*** 1.83***
Nominal liabilities of bankrupt ﬁrms “ -4.19*** -7.25*** 1.71***
Number of bankruptcies “ -4.18*** -4.19*** 1.18***
Bank capital/assets “ -6.26*** -6.49*** 1.48***
Bank provisions/assetsa “ -3.05** -3.00** 2.74**
Bank provisions/capitala “ -3.23** -3.11** 2.85**
Banking sector stock index/Toronto stock
index
“ -8.29*** -8.49*** 1.31***
Bankruptcy liabilities/GDPa “ -4.36** -4.36** 4.46**
Corporate proﬁts/GDP “ -5.96*** -4.78*** 0.92***
a. Level differences
b. Long-term government bond yield minus 3-month commercial paper rate (proxied with U.S. data)
Sources: See Table A153
Table A3: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Three lags of annual ﬁrst-differenced log of each variable (1946–2002)
Each entry shows the p-value (in percentage points) for an F-test that the lags of the regressor do not Granger cause
the dependent variable. The shaded entries indicate that the regressor causes the dependent variable, using a thresh-
















































































































































































GDP 69 26 26 39 88 11 25 19 58 12 74 87 73 8
Capital ratio 83 20 80 48 6 2 1 9 19 1 99 58 96 13 9 3 6
Bank capital 59 52 80 7 8 94 08 15 99 41 89 12 31 4 9 3
Bank assets 83 52 20 90 98 66 65 6 2 3 3 27 52 9 4 6
Bank proﬁts 68 25 17 11 66 92 26 9 5 7 8 609 5 2 82 4
Bank provisions 99 98 91 92 71 91 40 92 85 83 93 64 71 89
Corporate proﬁts 54 55 79 75 57 73 66 10 22 48 78 71 7 8
Bankruptcy liabilities 27 19 47 10 1 3 01 7 1 96 68 63 52 31 3 3 4
CPI inﬂation 97 48 23 96 71 10 27 39 46 43 36 27 20 78
Oil price 32 433 723 102 6 6 1 4 2 10 32 60 30
House prices 16 25 50 52 42 21 34 67 23 50 34 65 10 100
Bank index 72 17 33 10 92 57 56 83 25 83 33 70 55 58
TSX index 3 14 58 9 75 03 33 03 47 34 98 1 03 9
Bond yield 5 2 93 48 53 92 3 0 2 63 51 42 89 93 7 1 6
Term spread 42 7 6 24 93 53 82 7 12 539 1 1 82 8
Table A4: Pairwise Granger Causality Tests
Six lags of quarterly ﬁrst-differenced log of each variable (1946Q1 to 2002Q4)
Each entry shows the p-value (in percentage points) for an F-test that the lags of the regressor do not Granger cause the
dependent variable. The shaded entries indicate that the regressor causes the dependent variable, using a threshold confi-







































































































GDP 10 43 2 2 7 46 37 22 21 2
Capital ratio 96 21 31 11 62 35 30 33 84
Bank capital 32 1 3 05 58 85 63 1 46 9
Bank assets 29 11 8 04 7 3 075 4 8 8
CPI inﬂation 28 55 70 10 5 4 95 52 55 8
Oil price 57 8 7 8 4 809 7 2 8 47 2
Bank index 10 42 69 25 4 7 6 5 002 8
TSX index 0 1 9 17 3 9 7 3 9 0 1
Bond yield 16 8 0 4 07 05 97 42 7 0
Term spread 51 0 0 1 78 67 53 9 5 0
Sources: See Table A1
Sources: See Table A154
Table A5: Canadian Bank Exposures to Sovereign Borrowers
and the Availability of External Credit Ratings
Ranked by earliest rating from either S&P or Moody’s. The fourth column is the maximum exposure to the given country
between 1984 (the start of the reference period) and the first year that the sovereign obtained an external credit rating.
Sovereign Year of ﬁrst rating from
Standard & Poors






The following sovereign exposures had external credit ratings before 1984...
UNITED STATES 1941 1993 64.4
PANAMA 1997 1958 64.43
AUSTRALIA 1975 1962 67.13
NEW ZEALAND 1976 1965 67.36
DENMARK 1981 1967 67.39
JAPAN 1975 1993 71.91
FRANCE 1975 1992 72.9
AUSTRIA 1975 1977 73.46
NORWAY 1975 1978 73.7
FINLAND 1977 1977 73.71
VENEZUELA 1977 1987 74.19
SWEDEN 1977 1977 74.49
UNITED KINGDOM 1978 1978 78.71
PUERTO RICO 1980 78.71
GERMANY 1983 1993 79.45
SPAIN 1984 1988 79.85
...by 1984, 34% of Canadian bank exposures had external credit ratings.
IRELAND 1986 1987 1.37 79.85
ITALY 1986 1986 4.69 80.78
ARGENTINA 1993 1986 3.14 81.14
BRAZIL 1994 1986 15.5 82.64
MALAYSIA 1989 1986 1.56 82.95
PORTUGAL 1987 1986 1.47 83.13
GREECE 1987 1994 1.77 83.64
SINGAPORE 1987 1998 0.17 83.67
...by year-end 1987, 61% of Canadian bank exposures had external credit ratings.
BELGIUM 1988 1988 3.73 84.09
CHINA 1988 1988 0.11 84.17
KOREA 1988 1998 2.92 84.24
HONG KONG 1988 0.51 84.4
ISRAEL 1988 1995 0.11 84.87
LUXEMBOURG 1988 1999 0.16 85.72
THAILAND 1989 1989 0.57 85.93
TAIWAN 1989 1998 0.66 85.94
NETHERLANDS 1989 1998 0.17 86.39
INDIA 1990 1998 0.4 86.64
MEXICO 1991 1990 21.2 92.12
...by year-end 1990, 90.5% of Canadian bank exposures had external credit ratings.
INDONESIA 1992 1994 1.68 92.12
CHILE 1992 1999 1.31 93
TRINIDAD TOBAGO 1996 1993 0.77 93.27
COLOMBIA 1993 1993 2.43 93.29
PHILIPPINES 1993 1993 1.29 93.56
SOUTH AFRICA 1994 1994 0.17 93.93
BARBADOS 1999 1994 1.18 94.06
POLAND 1995 1995 2.24 94.18
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 1997 2001 0.84 94.23
BAHAMAS 1997 1.72 94.68
CAYMAN ISLANDS 1997 0.47 97.08
JAMAICA 1999 1998 2.09 98.1
SAUDI ARABIA 2003 1999 0.47 98.1
Sources: Authors’ calculations based on Moody’s (2003) and Standard and Poor’s (2003)55
Table A6: Counterfactual Basel II Requirements for Sovereign Exposures
Based on Bond Market-Implied Default Rates
Rankedbymeanimpliedratioofrequiredcapitalandprovisionstototalassets.SovereignexposuresincludeallCanadian
bank claims on public entities resident in the given country, converted to Canadian dollars at prevailing year-end market
exchange rates. 48 countries representing 98% of sovereign claims are listed.a Highly developed countries are assigned a
0 implied ratio.












1984-2002 mean 1984 2002
AUSTRALIA 0 +/-0 0 1.0 0.7 2.7
AUSTRIA 0 +/-0 0 0.2 0.2 0.6
BELGIUM 0 +/-0 0 0.8 3.7 0.4
DENMARK 0 +/-0 0 0.2 0.6 0.0
FINLAND 0 +/-0 0 0.2 0.2 0.0
FRANCE 0 +/-0 0 1.0 3.7 1.0
GERMANY 0 +/-0 0 1.5 0.4 0.7
IRELAND 0 +/-0 0 0.4 1.4 0.0
ITALY 0 +/-0 0 1.1 4.7 0.9
JAPAN 0 +/-0 0 2.5 0.1 4.5
LUXEMBOURG 0 +/-0 0 0.2 0.0 0.9
NETHERLANDS 0 +/-0 0 0.3 0.1 0.4
NEW ZEALAND 0 +/-0 0 0.2 0.3 0.2
NORWAY 0 +/-0 0 0.2 0.1 0.2
PORTUGAL 0 +/-0 0 0.3 1.5 0.2
PUERTO RICOb
b. Puerto Rico sovereign debts are assumed to be guaranteed by the United States.
0 +/-0 0 0.4 0.5 0.0
SPAIN 0 +/-0 0 0.8 4.4 0.4
SWEDEN 0 +/-0 0 0.5 1.3 0.3
UNITED KINGDOM 0 +/-0 0 2.3 1.6 4.2
UNITED STATES 0 +/-0 0 47.2 12.5 64.4
HIGHLY DEVELOPED 0 +/-0 0 63.6 38.0 82.0
SINGAPORE 2.5 +/-1.2 0 0.1 0.1 0.0
CAYMAN ISLANDS 3.1 +/-1.6 5.5 0.3 0.1 2.4
TAIWAN 3.1 +/-1.6 5.5 0.2 0.7 0.0
GREECE 3.5 +/-2.1 0 0.7 1.3 0.5
HONG KONG 4.2 +/-2 7.9 0.3 0.1 0.2
ISRAEL 4.3 +/-1.5 6.5 0.2 0.0 0.5
BAHAMAS 4.4 +/-1.7 7.9 1.1 0.8 0.4
CHINA 4.5 +/-1.7 7.9 0.2 0.1 0.1
KOREA 4.5 +/-3.6 4 0.5 2.9 0.1
MALAYSIA 4.5 +/-2 6.7 0.6 1.6 0.3
THAILAND 4.9 +/-3.2 11.1 0.2 0.6 0.2
SOUTH AFRICA 5.3 +/-1.9 9.6 0.2 0.1 0.4
SAUDI ARABIA 6.4 +/-2.1 11.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
POLAND 9.1 +/-2.4 7.6 0.8 0.8 0.1
INDONESIA 9.4 +/-6.4 21 0.4 1.7 0.0
INDIA 10 +/-3.2 15.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
BARBADOS 10.1 +/-2.6 9.6 0.6 0.3 0.1
TRINIDAD TOBAGO 10.1 +/-2.7 11.1 0.4 0.8 0.3
JAMAICA 12.3 +/-2.5 15.2 1.4 1.1 1.0
PANAMA 12.8 +/-2.5 13.2 0.4 0.7 0.0
PHILIPPINES 13.3 +/-2.6 14.8 0.5 0.9 0.3
DOMINICAN REPUBLIC 15.4 +/-2.5 14.6 0.2 0.3 0.0
MEXICO 18.6 +/-4.5 11.1 10.7 13.1 5.5
COLOMBIA 20 +/-5.3 20.2 1.2 2.2 0.0
CHILE 20.7 +/-3.4 21.4 0.5 0.8 0.9
VENEZUELA 20.7 +/-4.6 28.1 4.0 7.1 0.5
BRAZIL 22.1 +/-3.4 24.1 6.5 12.9 1.5
ARGENTINA 23.8 +/-12 65.1 2.2 2.7 0.4
LARGE EXPOSURES TO OTHERS 10.1 +/-2.7 13.4 32.1 54.1 16.0
ALL OTHERS NOT ABOVEc
c. All other sovereign exposures are assigned an 8% risk weight.
Sources: Merrill Lynch (2004); Datastream (2004)
8.0 +/-0.0 8.0 4.2 8.1 1.9
.56
Table A7: Number of Sovereign Borrowers with Credit Ratings









1985 2 9 2 14
1990 9 15 13 22
1995 22 19 32 22
2000 67 22 61 23
2003 69 22 71 25
Sources: Moody’s (2003); Standard & Poor’s (2003)57
Figure A: Annual impulse response functions
(one standard deviation shock, in percent)
*Based on a VAR of annual data from 1874-2002 (in year over year percent changes):













































































k response to k
Figure B: Quarterly impulse response functions
(one standard deviation shock, in percent)
*Based on a VAR of quarterly data from 1946-2002 (in quarterly percent changes at annual rates):
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